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ABSTRACT

Essays on the Impact of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth and
Development: The Case of Jordan

by
Jamal G. Husein, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 1998

Major Professor: Dr. Basudeb Biswas
Department : Economics

This dissertation examines the role of foreign aid in economic growth and
development ofJordan. The flow of foreign capital takes two main forms : private foreign
investment, mostly foreign direct investment by large multinational corporations, and public
development assistance (foreign aid) from both individual national governments and
multinational donor agencies.

The distinguishing characteristic of foreign aid is the

concessional element. In this dissertation, recent techniques and advances in time-series
analysis are used in the empirical section of Chapters 2 and 3, i.e., vector autoregression
(VAR), impulse response functions, and variance decompositions. In the fourth chapter, we
use a nonlinear three-stage least square estimate to test the impact of foreign aid on the fiscal
behavior of Jordanian government.
The results of this study indicate that foreign aid in its aggregated form exerted an
overall short-run positive dynamic impact on Jordanian growth rate of output, while it had

iii
a severe and long-run negative dynamic impact on domestic saving rate. When foreign aid
is decomposed into its two main components, i.e., foreign aid grants and foreign aid loans,
we found that grants exerted a long-run positive dynamic impact on Jordanian output growth
and a severe long-run negative impact on its domestic saving rate. On the other hand, foreign
aid loans had a positive but short-run impact on output growth and a positive long-run
dynamic impact on domestic saving rate. We also found that foreign aid significantly affects
both the revenue and expenditure side of the Jordanian government budget.
Foreign aid grants positively affect public consumption expenditures while foreign
loans had no significant impact on government consumption. We also found that tax revenues
in Jordan are mainly used to finance public consumption expenditures and not public
investment. Furthermore, in the presence of foreign aid (grants and loans), an increase in
taxes leads to an increase in public consumption expenditures and vice versa. Finally, the
results show that in the presence offoreign aid, the Jordanian public sector reduces its efforts
to collect taxes.
(135 pages)
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I, perhaps I never will be, perhaps I was not able,
Never was, never saw, don 't exist:
What is all this? In which June, in what wood
Did I grow until now, being born and born again?
I didn' t grow, never grew, just went on dying?

In doorways, I repeated
The sound of the sea, of the bells:
I asked for myself, with wonder,
(and later with trembling hands),
with little bells, with water, with sweetness:
I was always arriving late.
I have traveled far from who I was,
I could not answer any questions about myself,
I had too often left who I am.

I went to the next house,
To the next woman,
I traveled everywhere asking for myself, for you, for everybody:
And where I was not there was no one,
Everywhere it was empty because it wasn't today,
It was tomorrow.
Why search in vain
In every door in which we will not exist

Because we have not arrived yet?
This how I found out
That I was exactly like you and like everyone.

Neruda, Pablo
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CHAPTER!

INTRODUCTION

In the field of development economics, both policy makers and economists have
always considered the effects of foreign capital inflows, especially foreign aid,. and
domestic resources on economic growth of developing countries. Since the 1950s, there
has been a steady stream of econometric analysis and tests attempting to quantifY the
effects of both of these resources on economic growth.
The international flow of financial resources takes two main forms . First is the
official "public" development assistance (ODA) from individual national governments
and multinational donor agencies, known as bilateral and multilateral development
assistance. The objective of this kind of assistance must be noncommercial from the
donor's point of view, and be characterized by concessional terms, i.e., the interest rate
and repayment periods for borrowed capital are softer than market terms.1 The concept
of foreign aid encompasses currency and in-kind aid that transfers resources from
developed countries (DCs) to less-developed countries (LDCs). Included in these
transfers are those of the Organization ofPetroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to other
less-developed countries.2 A second form of resources comes through foreign private
investment, widely known as foreign direct investment (FDI), which is mostly done by
large international corporations with headquarters mainly in developed countries. FDI
1

According to this definition, military aid qualifies as foreign aid (ODA), since it is both noncommercial
and concessional. However, military aid is excluded from international economic measurements of foreign
aid See Todaro (1989).
2
Foreign aid in this study is defined as net bilateral and/or multilateral transfers received by the
government (grants), plus official long-term borrowing (loans).
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represents normal commercial transactions and is highly dependent on projected profits
and rates of return. Hence, it is not viewed as foreign assistance as it may or may not
benefit the developing country.
In the calculation of actual foreign capital inflows, especially the foreign aid
component, some conceptual and measurement problems have to be addressed. First,
dollar values of loans and grants cannot be simply added together since each has a
different significance to donors and recipients. Loans cost the donor and benefit the
recipient by less than the nominal value of the principal loan. Ideally, the interest-bearing
loans should be deflated or discounted before adding them to the value of outright grants.
Second, aid can be tied to purchase donor country goods and services (tied by source}, or
funds can be used only on specific projects (tied by project}, i.e., building roads, dams,
hospitals, etc. As a result the real value of the aid is reduced because the source is most
likely more expensive and/or the project may not be of highest priority to the recipient. If
aid is further tied to import capital-intensive equipment, an additional real resource cost
may be imposed in the form of higher unemployment in the recipient country. Third,
nominal versus real values of foreign aid, i.e., when foreign aid inflows are calculated at
nominal values, show a steady rise over time. However, when deflated, this may not be
the case.
The main goal of this dissertation is to further investigate the economic impact of
foreign aid on growth and gross domestic savings. In the second chapter, the relationship
between foreign aid inflows and both economic growth and gross domestic savings
(public and private) of Jordan is examined.

Specifically, we will quantify this

relationship by (1} examining the overall impact of foreign aid on the growth rate of
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Jordanian output (gross domestic product (GDP)); (2) investigating the impact of overall
foreign aid on Jordanian domestic savings (public and private); and (3) testing the impact
of domestic savings on output growth and foreign aid. Towards this goal, we use
macroeconomic time-series data for the Jordanian economy over the period 1964-95. In
this chapter we use a dynamic structural simultaneous equation model (DSSM) to capture
the dynamic interrelationships between foreign resources (aid), domestic resources, and
economic growth. Specifically, a vector autoregression (VAR) methodology is used to
analyze the relationship between growth, and both foreign resources and domestic
resources.
Chapter three will provide further answers to how the various components of
foreign aid affected both output growth and domestic savings. In this chapter we (I)
disaggregate the components of foreign aid into its two main components, foreign aid
grants, and foreign aid loans; and (2) measure how both of theses components (foreign
aid grants and foreign aid loans) affected the Jordanian growth rate of output and
domestic savings. In this chapter we also use a dynamic structural simultaneous equation
model (DSSM) to measure the dynamic impact of both grants and loans. A VAR
methodology is used again to analyze the relationship between economic growth, and
both foreign resources and domestic resources. Specifically, we will quantify this
relationship by measuring the dynamic effects of foreign resources (grants and loans) on
both the growth rate of Jordanian output (GDP) and domestic savings (domestic
resources)
Chapter four will answer the question of how foreign aid affects the public fiscal
behavior. In Jordan, like most LDCs, the public sector's role in planning and
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implementation of developmental projects is considerable. The rising level of Jordanian
public expenditures has been fueled by (I) capital inflows from public and private
sources abroad and (2) the mobilization of domestic resources through taxation and
domestic borrowing.

This chapter will assess the effectiveness of the Jordanian

government' s development efforts, and the impact that foreign aid has on both the
expenditure and the revenue side of the recipient (Jordan) government budget. The
methodology we adopt here regards the government maximizing its own welfare in the
face of budgetary constraints, and will use foreign aid as an instrument in the pursuit of
that objective.
This dissertation attempts to explain the impact that foreign aid (foreign
resources) had on the Jordanian economy. The statement of problem, objectives, and
procedure of each chapter are stated below. Chapter 5 includes an overall conclusion plus
a set of policy recommendations to the Jordanian government.

I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
Chapter two
The magnitude and time-path of the response of a country's domestic resources
(domestic saving) and its real output growth (GDP) to foreign resources (foreign aid)
have an important policy implication. The dynamic response of domestic ·saving and real
output growth of Jordan is examined through VARs, impulse response functions (IRFs),
and variance decompositions (VDCs}, using annual time-series for the period 1964-95.
Since the beginning of the 1960s, Jordan has received a large inflow of foreign aid from
oil-rich Arab countries, the United States of America, and the European community,
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averaging more than 20% of real GDP over the study interval. In addition, Jordan was
listed as the thirteenth top aid recipient among all less developed countries for 1990,
providing a test case to examine the overall effectiveness of foreign aid in promoting and
complementing growth and domestic resources, respectively.

Chapter three

Since chapter two in this dissertation provides an explanation of the impact of
overall foreign aid on output growth and domestic saving, the next logical step would be
to investigate further the impacts of the different components of foreign aid. Chapter
three examines the dynamic impacts of the two main components of foreign aid, foreign
aid grants and foreign aid loans. Considering the fact that various aid components may
have differential impacts on a recipient country, we will investigate the dynamic effects
of both of foreign aid's components on growth and domestic resources in Jordan. The
dynamic response of domestic saving and real output growth of Jordan is examined via
VAR, IRFs, and VDCs, using annual time-series for the period 1964-95. Foreign aid
grants averaged more than 15.4% of Jordan' s GDP for the time of the study, while
foreign aid loans averaged about 6% of GDP for the same period. Thus, Jordan can also
provide a test to examine the effectiveness of foreign aid grants and foreign aid loans in
promoting growth.

Chapter four
In chapter four, we test the relationship between foreign aid and government

fiscal behavior; specifically, the impact of foreign aid grants and foreign aid loans on
Jordan' s government budget is examined. The effectiveness of foreign aid grants and
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foreign aid loans in meeting the development efforts in Jordan is analyzed, and its impact
on alternative aggregate public expenditures and domestic revenues is evaluated. The
major work in the literature regarding this issue is Heller's (1975) paper, wherein he
postulates a maximizing policy maker and derives consistent behavioral equations in
order to estimate the impact of foreign aid grants and loans on various government
expenditures and revenues. One problem with Heller and other earlier studies is that the
data used were a pooled cross section of different countries with few time-series
observations. Hence, to draw any valid conclusions about a single country from such data
may be questionable. A structural simultaneous equation model for Jordan is derived
from a maximizing framework and estimated using a nonlinear . three-stage least square
procedure.

ll. OBJECTIVES
The main purpose of chapter 2 is to: (1) investigate the effects of overall foreign
aid on economic growth as an indicator of economic performance in Jordan; (2)
investigate further the impact of foreign aid on domestic resources (domestic saving), and
to determine whether foreign and domestic resources are complementary or substitute
inputs, and (3) prescribe some policy implications regarding foreign aid, which in return
depends on the magnitude and direction of the impact on growth and domestic resources.
The objective of Chapter 3 is to : (1) investigate further the impact of foreign aid
main components, foreign aid grants and foreign aid loans, on economic growth and
domestic resources of Jordan; (2) determine the kind of relationship between domestic
resources (domestic saving) and both of foreign resources (grants and loans), i.e., do they

7

complement or substitute each other; and (3) draw some conclusions and policy
prescription regarding both grants and loans for the case of Jordan.
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to: (1) analyze the relationship between foreign aid
and government fiscal behavior for Jordan and (2) determine the effects of foreign aid
components, i.e., loans and grants, on both the expenditure and the revenue side of the
Jordanian government budget.

Ill. OVERVIEW OF JORDANIAN

ECONOMY
The present Jordanian state compared to other states in the region (Middle East) is
considered relatively new. The state's origin dates back to 1920-21, when the British
appointed Prince Abdallah bin AI-Husayn, a member of the Hashemite clan, as a ruler of
the British-controlled territories east of the Jordan River with the official name
Transjordan. It became fully independent from Great Britain in 1946 and was renamed
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1950, following the unification with the Palestinian
West Bank. Since 1953, it has been ruled by King Husayn bin Tala!.
Jordan is considered to be one of the underdeveloped economies in the Middle
East. In the path toward growth and development, Jordan has faced significant obstacles:
a high 3.2% average annual growth rate of population for 1964-95, and a 4.9"/o urban
average population growth for 1962-92 (World Bank, 1994; Human Development
Report, 1994). Limited and underdeveloped domestic markets, scarcity of natural and
capital resources (since Jordan is a non-oil producing country), and an agricultural sector
that relies on rainfall makes investment in agriculture both risky and unfavorable.
Therefore, the undeniable role of the public sector has been to ensure satisfactory
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structure and rate of capital formation. In this context, the government's need for some
foreign assistance is easily recognized.
The external economic dependence of Jordan may be attributed to a desire for
economic growth and development set by different official Jordanian plans (three-year
development plan of 1973-75 and five-year development plans of 1976-80, 1981-86,
1981-85, 1986-90, and 1993-97), respectively. These plans had to overcome major
obstacles: (1) a high population growth and a long-term saving gap; (2) a rising amount
of expenditures for national and domestic security purposes related to 1967 and 1973
wars with Israel; 3 and (3) a foreign exchange gap since, for the time of the study, Jordan
on average imports almost two times more than it exports (export-import imbalance); this
gap needs to be filled by foreign capital.
With the 1967 war, Jordan lost control of the West Bank, and with it roughly one
third of the kingdom' s economy. Jordan also began to receive increasing levels of Arab
economic aid. Between 1964 and 1995, foreign aid (grants and loans) on average
accounted for no less than 48.9% of all government revenues and 20.9% of Jordan's real
gross domestic product (GDP). Such levels of foreign assistance supported a growing
public sector, with government recurrent expenditures representing on average one-third
of GDP for the same period.
Jordan, for the last 40 years or so, and according to the five-year plan (1993-97),
has been very successful in achieving most of its goals: a high level of growth in real
GDP, the building and establishment of necessary infrastructure to accompany the
3

The entry of more than a million Palestinian refugees to Jordan imposed an extra burden on the economy,
especially the public sector.
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development process, and the expansion and development of a set of services, i.e.,
education and health, that are vital to the development of human capital. Despite the
claimed accomplishments, the economy suffered from the following drawbacks: (I) a
deficit in both the balance of payment and the central government budget for the entire
period of study; (2) a reduction in the growth rate ofGDP for most of the 1980s; and (3)
a high level of unemployment that reached 23.6% for those in the 20-to-29 year range
and 17.1% for the entire economy in 1990 (five-year development plan 1993-97).
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CHAPTER2
THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN AID ON ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND DEVELOPMENT WITII EVIDENCE USING VECTOR
AUTOREGRESSION: THE CASE OF JORDAN

I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

During the 1950s, the United States, a capital-surplus nation, started a foreign
assistance program to help the less-developed countries (LDCs) to grow. During the
same period, many LDCs with shortages in capital adopted rapid economic growth as an
important national economic goal. Many of these countries resorted to foreign capital
acquisition to achieve this goal. Unfortunately, the failure of foreign aid to bring about
prosperity led to a series of debates between economists and policy makers in both
developed and less-developed countries on the role and effectiveness of foreign aid for
economic development.
The debate has centered on the following viewpoints. Writers on the left (Griffin,
1970; Griffin and Enos, 1970; Weisskoff, 1972) believe that the purpose of aid is the
perpetuation and extension of international capitalism. This radical or anti-aid view is
based on the hypothesis that foreign aid (I} substitutes rather than complements domestic
resources, (2) helps import redundant technology, (3) distorts income distribution, and (4}
is biased toward bigger, inefficient, and largely corrupted domestic governments. This
anti-aid view emerged as a result of the failing experiences of many capital-importing
developing countries, accompanied by an empirical phenomenon that showed foreign
resources substituted for domestic resources and exerted a negative effect on the recipient
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country.

This view also argues that foreign aid, in part, supplements consumption

(reduces domestic saving) if the level of income is given, or reduces the proportion of
income saved ifthe level of income rises. Empirical support of the above hypothesis was
derived from both time-series and cross-country analysis. Using a single equation method
and relating aid inflows to saving rates or investment rates as the dependent variable,
most empirical results reported a negative coefficient of aid on savings. These results are
summarized in Table I . Note that in cases where investment is considered the dependent
variable, the coefficients are not negative, yet substantially less than one, indicating a
marginal positive contribution of foreign aid to investment, but a substantial decrease in
domestic savings, since savings is defined as investment minus foreign inflows in these
studies.

In sharp contrast, writers on the right (Chenery and Bruno, 1962; Chenery and
Strout, 1966; Papanek, 1972; 1973) argue that capital imports exert significant beneficial
effects on the recipient country. This traditional or pro-aid view contends that foreign aid
not only augments domestic resources of the capital deficient country, but also helps
mitigate severe foreign exchange constraints, provides access to modern and new
technology, improves management skills, and allows easier access to foreign markets, all
of which contribute positively to economic growth. The pro-aid view is mainly based on
the Harrod-Domar growth model. This model was developed independently during the
1940s by Roy Harrod (1939) and Evsey Domar (1947), primarily to explain the
relationship between growth and unemployment in advanced capitalist societies, but has
been used extensively in developing countries as a simple way of looking at the
relationship between growth and capital requirements.
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The underlying assumption of the model is that output of any economic unit, a
firm , an industry, or the whole economy, mainly depends on the amount of capital
invested in that unit. If we call output Y and the stock of capital K, the relationship
between Y and K in the simplest form of the Harrod-Domar model can be written as
follows:
K
Y=-

(I)

v

where v is the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR). Converting (I) into a statement
about the growth rate of output, we obtain:

dY dK

I
v

- = - (-)

y

y

(2)

where dY I Y is the growth rate of output, and dK is the incremental increase in capital
stock that is net investment (I). Equation 2 can be rearranged as:

dK
dY
-=v(-)

y

y

(3)

such that investment-output ratio becomes the endogenous variable. According to
Equation 3 above and given a particular incremental capital output ratio, v, and a given
rate of output growth desired by any economy, the required investment rate to achieve the
targeted (planned) output. growth can be determined a priori. The investment rate needed
to achieve a particular level of growth may be obtained from domestic savings (domestic
resources), private capital inflows from abroad, i.e., foreign private investment, and/or
from official foreign capital inflows. If domestic savings are low and there are no or
limited prospects for foreign private investment, then foreign assistance (aid) may be
given to achieve the desired rate of growth.
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The above is simply the Rosenstein-Rodan (1961) savings gap approach to aid .
They argue that aid is required to fill the saving gap, and that a transition to selfsustaining growth will eventually be achieved if the marginal propensity to save exceeds
the average saving rate. Chenery and Strout (1966) formalized the savings gap model by
adding one more constraint to growth, the foreign exchange shortage that is equal to the
excess value of import requirements over export earnings. This constraint binds when the
rate of export growth, which is assumed to be exogenous, is insufficient to keep pace
with the growing demand for imports.4
Studies in which growth is regressed on aid (measured as a percentage of national
income) as one or as the only explanatory variable yield varying results. Papanek (1972)
derived a positive significant coefficient of0.20, while the coefficient was insignificant in
an analysis by Voivodas (1973), and negative in an analysis by Mosley, eta/. (1987).
Considering the fact that aid is not the only source of capital accumulation, most
of the above studies go about reestimating the equations, including the various
components of capital accumulation, i.e., domestic saving and foreign saving (foreign aid
and private inflows) on the right-hand side of the equation.

The results show a

differential impact of distinct sources of investments, but still not in a consistent manner.
For example, Papanek's (1973) cross-section study of 34 countries for the 1950s and 51
for the 1960s found that aid had a higher significant positive impact on growth than either
domestic saving or private capital inflows, though both domestic saving and private
capital inflows were positive and significant. On the other hand, Mosley ( 1980) shows
the opposite effect as given in Table 2.
4

Almomani (1985), in a study about Jordan,

For more on dual gap theory, see Chenery and Strout (1966), and for its critique, see White (1992).
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determined that aggregated foreign aid (foreign resources) had a positive and significant
impact on real GDP growth, had a positive but insignificant impact on domestic saving
(domestic resources), while foreign aid loans had a negative but insignificant impact on
growth. Almomani concluded that foreign aid loans have a negative impact on growth
and they neither helped to foster the rate of growth in the economy nor relaxed its savings
constraints. On the other hand, he also concluded that other foreign flows including
foreign aid grants have a positive and significant impact on growth.
All of the above-mentioned empirical studies used a single equation approach.
Whether the study is a pro- or anti-aid, it was attacked on a methodological basis. Over
(1975) criticized the Griffin and Enos (1970) article in which they disputed the
assumption that foreign capital relieves a country's savings constraint, thereby allowing
and encouraging the country to invest more in capital goods than its domestic saving rate
would ordinarily permit as mentioned earlier. Over disputed the exogeniety of foreign aid
and stated that aid was endogenous to the system, such that aid influences and is
influenced by the recipient country' s level of income.
Mosley (1980), recognizing the simultaneity problem, as well, criticized
Papanek' s (1973) method and results on the grounds that OLS is inappropriate if the
right-hand-side variables of the equation contain variables that are endogenous to the
system under examination. Mosley's (1980) results showed that Griffin's negative
relation between aid and saving still held, and he explicitly declared the collapse of the
positive and significant relationship between aid and growth shown by Papanek (1973)
and others, when applied to the less-developed countries as a whole. Table 2 summarizes

IS

some of the regression results of previous studies with method of estimation used, and
with any additional explanatory variables added in the right-hand-side of the equation.
The following points summarize the theoretical framework by which foreign aid
may affect gross domestic saving (public and private) of a recipient country: (I) If the
recipient government has a fixed growth rate of output as an objective, then any resources
for investment coming from overseas will induce the government to change its policies
and programs, which may reduce domestic saving by an amount equal to the inflow, and
(2) savings depend on investment opportunities available, and some of these will be preemptied by foreign investment (foreign aid). Hence, foreign inflows will be offset in part
by a compensatory reduction in domestic saving. Foreign aid supplements consumption
(reduce domestic saving) if the level of income is given, or reduces the saving rate
(proportion of income saved) if income level rises.
The precise channels through which an increase in foreign aid leads to a reduction
in domestic savings can be explained as follows. First, public saving may decline due to a
reduction in taxation, a reduction in the effort to collect taxes, and a change in the
composite of government spending in favor of consumption. Second, private saving will
decline due to the preemption of profitable opportunities, which would have generated
saving by domestic investors. Foreign aid, according to the above, will supplement
consumption and raise the capital-output ratio . This proposition can be shown as follows.
Let

dY

y = g where g is the growth rate of output, and

dK
dy

=v

S

(ICOR), y

ratio, and foreign aid to GDP ratio/. then from Equation 3 we have:

=s

the saving
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dY
SIY s
y- = g= lldY = -;,
which is the growth rate of output without the additional foreign aid ratio, f If a recipient
country, i.e., Jordan, receives an amount of foreign aid (foreign saving) that adds a
fraction to its GDP, j. then, if all this additional aid is saved (as = /) and there is . no
change in ICOR, then:

as

f

ag=-=av av

(4)

and g ' , the growth rate of output with the additional foreign aid (foreign saving}, if it is
all saved, becomes:

s+as

g'

s'

=v+av =-;;;-

(5)

where s' and v" are the new saving and new capital-output ratio, respectively. If part of
the additional foreign aid is consumed and part is saved, then:

• _ s' +(I - c)f
v'
'

g -

where c is the proportion of the additional foreign saving that is consumed. Hence,
growth rate due to additional foreign aid,/, is:

s' +(1 - c)f
g• - g = _ _;_v_•~'--

s
v

(6)

To illustrate the above, assume that foreign aid (foreign saving) adds 7.5% to
current real GDP. If all of this foreign saving goes to investment, and if the ICOR is 3,
then the growth rate of output will increase according to Equation 4 by 2.5%. Meanwhile
if part of these 7.5% additional resources is saved (invested) and part is consumed, i.e.,
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70% is saved and the remaining 30% is consumed, and the !COR remain unchanged, then
the growth rate of output will increase by only I. 75%. According to Equation 6, the
impact on growth can be positive if t.s is positive and c is small, and negative or even
negligible if ils is negative or very small, t.v is positive, and c is large. Incremental
capital-output ratio, v, is likely to rise in the presence of foreign aid : (I) for political
reasons, i.e., donor countries may concentrate their aid on large dramatic projects to show
their generosity (monuments); (2) when aid is tied to the purchase of goods and services
from donor countries, where their prices might be higher than the world price, or the
purchase of technologically abundant goods, which in both cases the recipient will have a
higher cost resource supply; and (3) it is usually the case that foreign aid changes the
pattern of investment in the recipient country in favor of social overhead capital, i.e.,
infrastructure, which will result in a direct bias against directly productive activities.
Of all of the single factor approaches to growth, the concentration on capital
formation "capital fundamentalism" is perhaps the most powerful and lasting for several
reasons. First, the solid theoretical grounds based on the Harrod-Damar model which is
explained earlier. This model sheds light on important aspects of growth and
development by focusing on meeting the investment requirements for growth without
inflation and unemployment. Second, most developmental plans of many LDCs since the
1950s coincided with aims and approaches of donor countries of the time, i.e., they
provided a readily applicable basis for justifying aid where capital shortage is widely
seen as the single most important barrier to growth. Accordingly, most LDC's
development plans were planned in a frame that clearly identified and reflected this
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capital shortage. Finally, capital fundamentalism is lasting because its framework is
flexible to incorporate new economic concepts such as the human capital formation.'
The critical role of saving and capital in output growth is well-established in
industrial societies. Several studies showed that the expansion in physical capital is
responsible for half of the growth in total income of nine developed countries prior to
1975. Other studies shows that the upper rates of per capita income growth in the U .S. in
the 1970s is mainly due to the very low investment rates relative to Japan and other
western Europe countries in the same period.6

II. THEORETICAL LINK, CONSUMPTION,
7
FOREIGN AID, AND DOMESTIC SAVING
For most issues in economics, especially development economics, as well as in
this chapter, the aggregate behavior of the economy ' s consumers is more important than
the behavior of any single individual consumer. How can the theory of consumer
behavior and individual demand analysis be applied to aggregate demand, which is a
8

" suitably defined sum of the demands arising from all economy's consumers (p. 105)"?

In what follows we will briefly investigate the relationship between consumption and
saving at the individual "consumer" level where we will draw some conclusions that we
hope will also hold in the aggregate. The question is when can aggregate demand be
expressed as a function of prices and aggregate wealth as the individual Walrasian
demand does? One aspect is the extent to which aggregate demand can be accurately
5

See Levine and Renelt (1992) paper for a survey of the recent literature on growth.
See Gillis eta/. (1983) for two studies "The Source of Economic Growth in the U.S." and " Why Growth
Rates Differ."
7
This section is based on the analysis in Becker (1971).
8
See Mas-Colell eta/. (1995) for a detailed analysis of aggregation.
6
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modeled as function of aggregate variables, such as aggregate or average consumer
wealth. When an economy receives more resources (aid), this supplements its available
income, part of which will be expended on increasing current and part on augmenting
future consumption. With current consumption rising, at a given income, current
domestic saving will fall ; on the other hand, with a rising income, the proportion of
income saved will fall. In this context, we will treat aggregate demand as if .a
"representative" consumer generated it and use the changes in this "fictional" individual
behavior as a measure of aggregate behavior. The representative consumer in the
economy needs to decide on an optimal time path for consumption given an intertemporal
utility function. Assume that a representative agent's preferences at any moment in time
will depend not only on current consumption, Co, but also on consumption n periods in
the future,

c~, ~

. ... , C.:
U= U(C0 ,C,, ... ,C.)

where U is the present utility, and Co, C1,

... ,

(7)
Cn are planned consumption n periods

ahead. Define this agent's income, I, in each period as the sum of all earnings, receipts
from ownership of property, and all other receipts from all other sources. If consumption
in period i equals total income in that period, it follows that the Walrasian demand for
this representative consumer is:

I,

c.=P;

(8)

1

where P; is the price of a unit of C;, I; is the income in period i, and the allocation of
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consumption over time in Equation 8 would be easy and straightforward

9

Equation 8

implies that the consumer fully expends his income, but in a broader sense, it also implies
that the consumer budget is an intertemporal one allowing for savings today to be used
for tomorrow' s consumption. What Walras' s law says is that the consumer fully expends
his resources over his lifetime. If we allow for the exchange between consumption at
different times so that consumption may not be necessarily tied to income of the same
period, a minor adjustment is necessary since dollars in period i are not comparable to
those of period j, unless multiplied by a price that measures the number of dollars in
period j considered equivalent to a dollar in period i. If current consumption, Co, is
reduced by one dollar, then I + ro additional dollars will be available for consumption in
period I, where ro is the current real interest rate, and so on. Any combinations of
expenditures are feasible as long as their present value (total cost) does not exceed the
present value of receipts (total wealth) 10 :
(9)
where Wo is the agent' s wealth, and the discount rate 81 = Ill +ro. and so on. The
representative agent is assumed to maximize utility in Equation 7 subject to the budget
constraint in Equation 9 such as:

9

MUcl =

MUc2 :::: .. = MUcn

P,
P,
This constraint requires that total spending does not exceed the consumer' s available resources (wealth).
We use wealth terminology to emphasize that the consumer's actual problem is indeed intertemporal, with
consumption commodities purchased over time.

P,

10
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MaxL = U ( C0 , . . ,C.)-.-1. ( LB,P;C; -W, )

(10)

i=O

and the first-order conditions are:

iJ L

iJC; = MU; - B,P;A.

(11)

=0

or

MU
- -'= .-1.

(12)

B,P;

where A. is the marginal utility of wealth. Hence, the optimal consumption path will
equalize the marginal utilities of the last present dollar spent in consumption in each
period:
for all i and j , or

MU; - B,P;
MU, - B,P,

(13)

Simply, 6;P;/6jPj is the number of units ofCj (consumption in period j) that can be traded
for a unit of C; (consumption in period i) which equals the rate of exchange in utility
between the two periods. Note that if a rise in the price of consumption between the two
periods (P;/Pj) is offset by an equal percentage decline in the value of the dollars between
the two periods (6;/6j), the real terms of trade will not change between the two periods.
The downward sloping demand curve assures that a compensated decline in 6;P; would
increase consumption in period i at the expense of consumption in period j . Accordingly,
an increase in wealth will tend to increase consumption in period i. Figure 1 illustrates
the case of a representative consumer who is in equilibrium at e; at equilibrium, the agent
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consumes Co in the current period and C1 in the next period, given his wealth and
assuming for simplicity that P 0 =P1=P. In Figure 2 assume that the consumer's wealth
increases and that causes the intertemporal budget line to shift outward, and the
equilibrium position to change. What point on the new line will this consumer choose?
Points e1 and e2 represent the limits of the consumer choice. If the consumer is free to
choose, the equilibrium can be e1, e2, or e3 or for that matter any point between e2 and e 1.
As long as the choice satisfies his/her relative taste for present and future consumption
(any point outside this range will clearly sacrifice either current or future consumption)ll
Point e 1 represents an equilibrium case where all that additional income is being
consumed in current period (Co) and none in the next period. Meanwhile equilibrium
point e2 represents the opposite case where all that additional income is put on hold
(saved) for future consumption. Finally, all the points in between represent a combination
of the two cases. Simple demand theory tells us that an increase in income will shift the
demand curve for current consumption to the right unless current consumption (Co) is an
inferior good, and the size of the shift is mainly determined by the income (wealth)
elasticity of demand for current consumption, Co. The elasticity of the demand curve is
inversely related to the curvature of the indifference curves and directly related to how
easy it is to substitute future consumption, i.e., C1 for current consumption, Co (elasticity
of substitution). Thus, the larger the elasticity, the easier it is, in terms of utility, to reduce
current consumption (increase current savings) in order to increase future consumption.
Hence, current consumption is determined by the slopes of the indifference curves along
a given ray from the origin. If the slopes are identical, then all wealth elasticities will
11

The figure

is adopted from Mosley (1980).

23

equal one (all additional income in current period will be consumed). If the slopes are
larger (in absolute value) at higher levels of indifference curves, then current
consumption, C0 , will have an elasticity less than one, and part of the additional income
will be consumed in current period, and part in the future. Keynes' second law of
consumption assumes that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is less than the
average propensity to consume (APC) and, hence, the indifference curves between
present and future consumption at higher preference levels are more biased toward future
consumption.
To summarize, the rate of consumption growth between the current period and a
single future one is inversely related to 81 (positively related to ro) because a
compensated increase in 9 1 will raise Co and reduce C1 . It also depends on two other
parameters of the indifference curves, time preference and the elasticity of substitution
between the two periods. Time preference measures whether an increase in current
consumption increases current utility by a greater amount than an equal increase in future
consumption. The diminishing marginal rate of substitution implies that marginal utilities
of current and future consumption change symmetrically with the change of consumption
level. If present and future consumption are equal, the shape of the indifference curves
can be isolated from a movement along them by defining time preference by the marginal
utilities (this is equivalent to defining it by a slope of an indifference curve along the 45degree line in Figure 2). Preference is said to be for present, future, or neutral as the

MU,

slope is less than, greater than, or equal to one, i.e., MUo

=-slope, hence -slope;:-< I as
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MUt
MU0 ;::- MU1 , and in equilibrium 81 = MU . Preference for present consumption
0

reduces the growth rate of consumption while preference for the future does the opposite.
If9 1=1 (future dollars are as valuable as present ones), the consumption falls over time if
the present is preferred, but increases if the future is. Alleged preferences for present
have been used to explain the increase in current consumption at lower levels of income
when income starts to rise, hence why some countries grow faster than others. If 81 < I
and preference is time neutral, the consumption will grow over time at a rate that depends
on how fast the slope of an indifference curve declines as future consumption increases
relative to the present, i.e., on the elasticity of substitution between present and future
consumption.

III. METHODOLOGY AND THE MODEL
This section outlines the econometric modeling that we use in the second chapter.
It uses a time-series data model to estimate the effects of foreign aid on the economic

growth and domestic saving of Jordan. The econometric implications of this method are
described in this section.
The mixed results reported previously regarding the impact of foreign aid on
economic growth and domestic saving imply that the growth-aid relationship is not a
simple one. Hence, a dynamic structural simultaneous equation model is· built to capture
the interrelationships between growth rate of Jordanian real output, domestic saving, and
foreign aid.
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A VAR method is used to study the relationships between growth rate of real
output (GDP), gross domestic saving, and foreign aid in Jordan. This modeling technique
allows the time path of each dependent variable to be influenced by the time path of all
other variables in the model. When a single equation model cannot explain the
relationship between economic variables in a dynamic system, a system of various
dynamic equations may be required describing the data-generating process adequately. A
VAR model is used to examine the dynamic effects of foreign aid on economic growth
and domestic saving. This modeling technique is regarded as an important tool for
economic analysis, since its introduction by Sims (1980). Innovation accounting analysis
will be used to examine the interrelationships among the economic variables in the
system. Specifically, impulse response functions (IRFs) and variance decomposition
(VDC) are computed from these models to investigate the dynamic relationships among
the model's variables.
As preliminary data analysis, all variables are checked for stationarity. If the
series are nonstationary, results obtained from standard econometric techniques can be
misleading. The Philips-Perron Zt(q) test for a unit root is performed on each series. This
test is a generalization of the Dickey-Fuller procedure that allows a mild assumption
regarding the distribution of the error term. Without going into detail, the Philips-Perron
test statistics are modifications of the Dickey-Fuller t-statistics that take into account a
less restrictive nature of the error process, and since the Philips-Perron test is the least
restrictive, its results are reported and followed. Also, the critical values for the Philips-
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Perron test statistics are the same as the Dickey-Fuller tests.t

Table 3 contains the results of the unit-root tests that were performed with the use
of different values of the lag parameters: q = 1, 2, and 3. For output growth, Yu, gross
domestic saving as a percentage of GDP, Y21, and foreign aid as a percentage of GDP,
Y3,, the hypothesis of the unit-root test can be rejected at either the 1%, 5%, or ·10%

significance level.
Consider the macroeconomic time-series variables, growth rate of real output
(GDP) Yu, gross domestic saving (both public and private) as a percentage of GDP Y21,
and foreign aid as a percentage of GDP Y31, respectively, where all ar~ endogenous to the
system. Since Yu, Y21 , and Y 31 are jointly determined, a structural simultaneous equation
model relating those three endogenous Gointly determined) vector Y1 to p predetermined
variables and a vector of error terms U1 can be written as:
(14)

or in a compact form:
(14')

B0 Y,=K+B,Y, (L)+ U,
where Y1

= (Yu, Y21 , Y31 )'

( kt, k2 , k3 )'

a (3 x 1) vector of the dependent variables at timet, K =

a (3 x 1) vector of intercept terms, B, =a (3 x3) matrix of autoregressive

coefficients, Bo = a (3 x3) matrix which captures the contemporaneous effects in the
system.

-B"]
-B23

-B32

1

tl See Enders (1995) and Hamilton (1994) for further analysis of the Philips-Perron unit-root test.
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Y, (L) =a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L of order P. U, = (Uu,U,,, UJt)' a (3 x 1)
disturbance vector which is assumed to be a stationary process with E (U,) = 0; E(U, U,')
=0 for t "' s ; E( U, Ut') = 0 .
The multivariable V AR in Equation 14 incorporates feedback in the system since
Yu, Y21, and YJt are allowed to affect each other.

For example, B 12 is the

contemporaneous effect of a unit change in Y,, on Yu, B21 is the contemporaneous effect
of a unit change in Y u on Y21, and BJt and B32 are the contemporaneous effects of Y u and
Y21 on YJt, respectively, and so on. Also, note that the U1 (error vector terms) are pure
innovations in the dependent vector Y1. Equation 14 is not a reduced form since the Y1
vectors have contemporaneous effects on each other. We can transform the system in
Equation 14 into a more usable form .

Premultiplying both sides of the system in

Equation 14 by B 0 ' 1 allows us to obtain the vector autoregressive (VAR) model in its
standard form (reduced form):

Y,

= B~' K + B~' B,Y,_ , + B~ 'B,Y,_, +. .+B~'B,Y,_ 1 + B~'U,

(15)

or

Y,

=

c +ell,Y,_, +ell,Y,_, + .. +ell ,Y,_p +&,

(15')

Equation 15' in a compact form becomes:

Y, =C+ell,Y,(L)+&,
where C =

B;' K

(16)

the standard (reduced form) VAR vector intercepts, ell, =B;'B, for

s =I , 2, 3, .. .p (the reduced form VAR parameters), &,= B;'U, (the standard "reduced
form" innovation vector).
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Assuming that U1 is a vector white noise,

E1

will be recognized as vector white

noise and Equation 16 will be the vector autoregressive representation for the dynamic
structural system (DSS) in Equation 15 . Thus, a VAR can be viewed as the reduced form
of a general dynamic structural model (GDSM). Note also that the vector error terms

E1

are composites of the shocks U, .

IV. IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM
Since the structural VAR system in Equation 14 is underidentified and cannot be
estimated directly due to the feedback inherent in the system (Enders, 1995), i.e.,Y21 and
YJ, are correlated with Uu, Y 11 and Y31 are correlated with U 21 and finally Y21 and Y31 are
correlated with U31, one way to solve this identification problem is to use the recursive
system proposed by Sims (1980) and impose a priori restriction, which may be suggested
by economic theory to restrict some coefficients in the contemporaneous parameter
matrix (i.e., in a three-variable V AR, 3 2 - 3/2 restrictions are needed for identification).
Using Sim's recursive system, we restrict B 21 = B31 = B 32 =zero, given this restriction, B0
and B 0" 1 become:

(B12 )(B23 ) + (Bn )]
(B2,)
.
I

The above restrictions imply that current output growth has no contemporaneous effect
on current aid. It is likely the case that current aid is usually decided upon a period or
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two ahead through official negotiations between donors and recipients before it is
actually disbursed. With the goal that aid will accelerate future targeted and planned rate
of growth desired by the recipient country official plans, recipient official governments
usually set a targeted level of growth a priori and direct their policies to obtain necessary
funds "aid" to achieve that target growth. Meanwhile, current foreign aid will have a
contemporaneous effect on output growth and, depending on how the recipient
government utilizes this aid inflow (consumption vs. investment), the path of future
growth will be affected.
The same logic can be applied to explain why current gross domestic savings
have no contemporaneous effect on current foreign aid levels. Since current gross
domestic saving is postulated to affect current output contemporaneously and
"positively," current gross domestic saving will affect current output growth which in
return will supposedly affect future foreign aid values disbursed to the recipient country.
Hence, gross domestic savings have no contemporaneous effect on foreign aid.
The previous restrictions embody the explanation of the third and last restriction
needed to recover the structural parameters. Foreign aid is assumed to facilitate and
accelerate the process of output growth (raise income levels) which, in return, will
generate a higher savings as a result of anticipated higher levels of income. This implies
that foreign aid affects gross domestic saving contemporaneously. On the other hand, it
is current domestic saving that impacts future aid disbursed, which depends on how
current domestic saving reacts to foreign aid. All of this leads to the ordering of our

Y~

i.e., foreign aid is placed prior to both domestic saving and output growth, while domestic
saving is placed prior to output growth.
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In terms of innovations (shocks), the above restrictions imply the following
innovation system:

[c,,"Ic,,t ]-- [1
0

0

0

or

c,

= U, + B, U,
t:3 ,=U,

.

The above restrictions allow the recovery of the structural (primitive) VAR
parameters. Since the model is just identified, full information maximum likelihood
(FIML) estimates of the structural parameters can be obtained by maximizing the
likelihood function with respect to standard VAR (reduced form) parameters, i.e., cl>, and
I;.. Then we can use the unique mapping from the estimated reduced form parameters to

recover the structural ones (Hamilton, 1994). Since the objective of this study is to
examine the dynamic impact of foreign aid on both output growth and domestic
resources, the focus will be on the impulse response functions (IRFs) and the variance
decompositions (VDCs).

V. ISSUES OF VAR LAG LENGTH
The Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwartz Bayesian criterion (SBC),
Akaike final prediction error (FPE), and the Hannan-Quinn criterion will be used to
identify the appropriate lag length P in equation (16). The order P is chosen so that the

31

above-mentioned criteria are minimized. This test criterion is based on several criteria
that have been proposed for estimating the order of a VAR process. Researchers have
suggested minimizing Aikaike 's final prediction error (FPE), Aikaike information
criterion (AIC), Schwartz Bayesian criterion (SBC), or Hannan-Quinn (HQ) criterion.
These criteria are defined as follows:
FPE(n)=[(T+nM+ 1)/(T-nM-I)]M det:En
AIC (n) =Log (det (:En)+ 2M n2
SBC (n) =Log (det (:En)+ (Log (T)/T) n M 2
H-Q (n) =Log (det (:En))+ (( 2 log (log (T)))/T) n M 2
where M = number of variables in the system, T

= number of observations in the

sample, n =order of the VAR process (n =I, 2, ... P), and En= an estimate of the
residual covariance matrix obtained with a VAR (n) process.
Clearly, adding additional regressors will reduce log (det

(~))

at the expense of

increasing N. The four above criteria will be estimated for a potential maximum number
oflags, i.e., models with n = 0, I, ... , Pare estimated with P specified as an upper bound,
and a VAR (n) model that minimizes the AIC, SBC, FPE and/or H-Q criterion will be
selected.

13

(Note that in the procedure the sample size T has to be held fixed, i.e., in

each estimation P observations are treated as presample values.)
The lag structure is identified for each potential number oflags n = 0, .. , P (due to
the degree-of-freedom consideration, the maximum lag length entertained is set to five).
The above four criteria are estimated for all potential lags entertained and the results are
13

For more detailed analysis, see Lutkepohl (1993), Enders (1995), and Judge eta/. (1988).
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reported in Table 5 . It can be seen from the results that both SBC and FPE criteria are
minimized with a zero-lag, while both AIC and H-Q criteria are minimized at a one-lag
V AR. To decide which lag model is more appropriate, the maximum chi-square

procedure provides a maximum likelihood test statistic for evaluating whether increasing
the order of a model significantly improves the fit. Sims (1980) suggested a test statistic
measuring improved fit as:
S = (T-K) {Log (det (L..) -log (det (L.,)}
where T

=

number of observations in the sample, Det (L..) & (L.,)

=

determinant of the

covariance matrices of the residuals of both the restricted and unrestricted models,
respectively, and K = a correction factor to improve small sample properties suggested by
Sims ( 1980) and equals the number of parameters estimated per unrestricted equation
(l+Mnt).
This statistic S has an a symptotic chi-square distribution and is used to test the
null hypothesis that adding the (n + l)u, lag to the system does not significantly improve
the model's fit. The test has M 2 (n 1

-

11o) degrees of freedom. Since estimated S equals

32.5, which exceeds 14.68 (the 10% chi-squared critical value), the null hypothesis is
rejected. The dynamics are not completely captured by a zero-lag; rather a one-lag V AR
specification seems preferable. Hence, a model with n = I is chosen.
Given the assumptions in Equation 15 that the error vector Ut is white noise, it
follows that Et the standard VAR error vector will have the same stochastic properties,
i.e., the E1 will have a mean zero and E [e 1 ]
E [E, E,' ]

=

0 fort "' s, and E [Et Et' ]

=

=

0, £ 1 £,are individually uncorrelated, i.e.,

I:,. Since the standard VAR is symmetric, the
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least squares estimator of the standard V AR is consistent, and joint estimation techniques
do not increase estimation efficiency.
Because of the presence of many parameters and the difficulty of interpreting
them in a standard V AR, Sims (1980) argued and made popular what has been called
innovation accounting. The informational content of a VAR is better summarized by a
moving average representation. Hence the next step in this chapter is to investigate the
dynamic response of both growth rate of real output and domestic saving (resources) to
innovations (shocks) in foreign aid.
The standard VAR system is triangulized using the Choleski decomposition so
that the innovation (impulses) of the last variable (foreign aid) according to our ordering
contemporaneously affects itself and the values of all other variables in the system, i.e.,
both output growth and domestic saving. While the innovation of the penultimate
variable (variable before the last, i.e., domestic saving) contemporaneously affects itself,
it also affects the values of all but the last variable in the system. In terms of innovations
(shocks), the above Choleski decomposition implies the innovation system mentioned
earlier in terms of the three shocks &u,

&21,

and &Jt.

VI. IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS
Just as an autoregression has a moving average representation, a VAR can be
written as a vector moving average representation (VMA). The VMA is an important
feature of Sims (1980) methodology, where it allows us to trace out the time path of
different innovations on the variables contained in the VAR system. The VMA ( oo )
representation of Equation 6 can be written as follows :
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Y, = p +&, + 'P,c,_, + 'P, c,_, + .. = p + 'P(L)c,

(17)

or in a compact form:
(I 7')
where J.l = E[Y,] = (I - <1>1 - <l>p/ c and '¥, can be computed recursively from <l>i. Sin·ce '¥
(L) and <I> (L) are related such that'¥ (L) = [<I> (L)]" 1 requiring that:

Setting the coefficient on L 1 = 0 gives us '¥ 0 =In, and setting the coefficient on L2 = 0
gives us '¥1 = <1>1 , and setting the coefficient on L 3 = 0 gives us <1>1 '¥1 + <1> 2, and so on. In
general and for L', '¥, can be computed as:

for s= 1,2,3, ...

(18)

The matrix '¥, in equation ( 18) has the interpretation:
(19)
which simply means that the row i, column j element of'¥, identifies the consequence of
a one-unit change in the jth variable' s innovation at time t (Ejt) for the value of the ith
variable at time t + s (yi, 1..,), while holding all other innovations at all times unchanged .

If, for example, we change the first element of &1, i.e., an innovation to foreign aid by
the second element of Et changes by

A-2,

and the

~element

A.~,

by A.n, the combined effects on

the vector Y1 at timet+ s would be given by:
(20)
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where A.

=

(1. 1 ,

~ , .. . ,

A..)' . One way to find the numerical multipliers contained in the

'¥, matrix is by simulation. If we set the values ofY1• 1 = Y1•2 = .. . = Y1.p = 0, and set

&;1=

J(i.e., &Jt = 1 or one unit innovation to foreign aid) while all other elements of c and &1 are
equal to zero, we will be able to trace out the value of the vector Y,.,. for s periods ahead.
The value of the vector Y, at date t + s for example corresponds to the jth column of the
matrix 'f',. By simulating separate innovations for each element

of&~

all the columns of

'¥, can be computed. A plot of the row i, column j element of 'f', as a funct ion of s is
called the impulse response function (IRF).
Equation 19 above describes the effect of an innovation in the j,h variable on the
future values of each of the variables in the system, and since s, =

B~ 'U,

the VAR

innovation Ejt are linear combinations of the structural disturbances U1. Viewed this way,
it may not be clear why the magnitude in Equation 19 is of any interest.

8Y,.,

(20')

au;

It will be of particular interest to us since it describes the dynamic consequences for the

system as a result of a change in the structural innovation vector Ut Towards that end,
and given both the ordering of our variables and the restrictions we imposed on Bo (the
matrix that captures the contemporaneous effects of the system), such that Bo is upper
triangular, the multipliers in the system can be calculated from the moving average
coefficients ('¥,) and the variance-covariance matrix of &, (Q). Since

n

is positive

definite, there exists a unique upper triangular matrix A and a unique diagonal matrix D
with positive entries along the principal diagonal that satisfies Q=A D A' . Based on this
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matrix A, we can construct a (n

x

I) vector, call it U, for now such that U1 = A

1

&1,

where

U1 takes all the properties of£,, i.e., it is uncorrelated with its own lags or with lagged
values of Y1, and they are not correlated with each other, i.e., E(U, U,) = D "a diagonal
matrix." Premultiplying both sides ofU, = A' 1 &1 by A, we obtain A U1 = &1, which in the
matrix form can be written as:
0

0
0

o u"
o U2 ,

&u

u,,

&,,

(21)

u.,
Thus, Uu is &u, and generally Ujt = &jt- ail Uu- aj2 U2t- .. . - ai.i-1 U i-1, ,. Hence, for a given
observed sample of size T, the autoregressive coefficients a, , , a, , , .. , a, , will be
estimated by ordinary least square (OLS), .; , matrices will be simulated as explained
previously, and an estimate of the variance-covariance matrix
matrices

n will be obtained. Both

A and iJ satisfying An ; · _0 can be constructed. Also, the elements of

u, ~ A·' ;,

are orthogonal by construction. Hence, our orthogonalized impulse response

function will be given by:
(21 ')
A

where

a j

A

denotes the jth column of the matrix A. A plot of Equation 21' as a function of

s is our orthogonalized impulse response function, which is simply based on
decomposing our standard VAR vector innovations &1, into a set of uncorrelated vector

37

components U1, and calculating the consequences for Yt+• of a unit impulse in U; 1 . Given
the A matrix, the VMA (oo) representation ofY, in Equation 17 ' becomes:

Y,

=L 'I', A-' A&,

(22)

J'=O

A

Equation 22 is the Cholesky decomposition of

n, and

the impulse response functions in

21' are the orthogonalized impulse response functions . From Equation 14', our structural
disturbance vector is U1, which is related to the reduced V AR innovations &1 by U1 = B0

&1,

if by any chance our structural parameter matrix Bo, is found to be exactly equal to A\
then our orthogonalized innovations would be equal to the true structural disturbances,
i.e., U1 = Bo &1 = A 1 &1. If this is the case, the impulse response functions described in 21 '
will help answer the question in 20'. Since A is upper triangular and B 0 is restricted to be
upper triangular as well, and further it is assumed that the vector U, are serially
uncorrelated and uncorrelated with each other, i.e., E ( U, U,') = D "diagonal matrix" fort
=

s and 0 otherwise, and given that B"10 U1 =

reduced form V AR

&1 ,

the variance-covariance matrix of the

n implies:

il=E(.s,.s; )=B~' E(U,U; )(B~'Y = B~ ' D(B~'Y

(23)

Since our structural model is just identified due to B0 being upper triangular with
unit coefficients along its principal diagonal and the D matrix is being diagonal, this
necessarily implies that B 0"1 must be upper triangular with unit coefficients along its
principal diagonal as well. Given our A matrix that satisfies

n =AD A', unique values

1

for B0 " and D can be found to satisfy Equation 23, B, can be estimated uniquely from B0
and cl>,, i.e., B, = -B 0 cl>,. Hence, given any estimated values for the reduced form
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parameters (B 0 , <I>,, !1), there exist unique values for the structural parameters (B 0 , B,, D).
FIML estimates of the structural parameters can be obtained by maximizing the
likelihood function with respect to the standard V AR parameters (B 0 , <I>,, !1) and using
the unique mapping from the standard V AR estimates to recover the structural parameters
(B 0 , B,, D). The maximum likelihood estimates of <I>, are found by OLS regression, while
the maximum likelihood of the variance-covariance matrix
residuals of those regressions. The estimates of

B;'

Cholesky factorization of 6 . As a result, the estimate

and

.D

n

is obtained from the

are the ones found by

A described before is the same as

the FIML estimate of Bo -1. The orthogonalized residuals vector U 1 = A" 1 e1 corresponds to
vector of structural disturbances, and most importantly, the orthogonalized impulse
response coefficients give the dynamic consequences of the structural impulses
represented by U 1.

Vll. VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION
Understanding the properties of the forecast errors is helpful in explaining further
the interrelationships among the variables in the system. Based on our estimations of the
parameters C, <I>,, and

n in Equation 16, and if we want to forecast the various values of

Yt+i conditional on the observed values Y1, the optimal (the forecast mean square error for
each variable is minimized) forecast is the conditional expectation given all information
up to the period in which the forecast is to be made. Assuming the VAR generating
process is known to us as in Equation 16, the conditional expectation Y, ofY,+, given Y,_
1,

Yt-2, ... , Yt-p s periods ahead is given by:
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Y,., =E[ Y,., ]=C + <1> 1 £[ Y,.,_, ] + .. +<I>, E[ Y,.,_,]

(24)

or

=C+<I>, Y, (s-1)+ ... +<1>, Y, (s- p)
where Y, (s- i) = Y1...; for i

~

s and E

[~:,.,. ] =

(25)

0 has been used. Equation 25 can be

applied to computing S step forecasts for S = I, 2, .. . , i.e., for a hypothetical VAR (I)
process a three period forecast is obtained as:

Y,(I) = C + <I>,Y,
Y,(2) = C + <1> 2 Y,(1) = C +<I>,C + <l>iY,
Y,(3)=C+<I>,Y,(2)=(1+<1>, +<l>i)C+<I>:Y,
and so on. The mean square error matrix (MSE) is used as a measure of the forecast
uncertainty, denoting the MSE matrix of an S step ahead forecast by MSE (S). We
obtain:

MSE(S) = E[(Y,. , -Y,(S))(Y,. , -Y,(S))"]

(26)

since the forecast Y, (S) is unbiased, i.e., E [ Y, .. - Y, (S) ] = 0, MSE (S) is the forecast
error covariance matrix, it can be shown that the MSE matrix of the standard VAR in
Equation 16 has the form:

MSE(S)
where n = E ( ~:1 ~:,·

).

=0+'¥10'¥; + '¥2 0'¥; + ... +'i',_,n'i';_,

(27)

'i', are computed recursively as shown in Equations 18 and 19

earlier. The question to answer now is how much of our orthogonalized innovation vector
U1 contributes to the above MSE in Equation 27. From Equation 21 we have:

e, =AU,
=a,U11 +a,U,, + ... +a.u.,

(28)
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where ai denotes the jth column of the matrix A, which is defined earlier. Postmultiplying
Equation 28 by its transpose and taking expectations yields:

where VAR (Uj1) is the row j, column j element of the matrix D defined earlier.
Substituting Equation 29 into 28, the MSE error of the S period ahead forecast can be
written as:

MSE(S)

.

=L{Var(U1,). [a1a j + '1' a1a;'P;+ . .+ '1',_1apj'P;_,]}.
1

(30)

i=1

With Equation 16, we can calculate the contribution of any orthogonolized innovation to
the MSE of the S period ahead forecast. For example, the S = 3 contribution of the
innovation Uu (foreign aid) to the MSE is:

The above forecast error variance decomposition simply tells us the proportion of the
movements in a sequence or a vector Y, due to its own innovations versus iimovations of
other variables in the system. If, for example, U u (foreign aid innovations) explains none
of the forecast error variance of Y3, (GDP growth) at all forecast horizon or S periods
ahead, we can say that Y3 1 is exogenous and its sequence would evolve independently of
Uu innovations and Yu (foreign aid). On the other hand, the other extreme case would be
when Uu innovations would entirely explain all the forecast error variance in the
sequence S periods ahead, so that Y3, would be entirely endogenous.

YJt
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VIII. DATA
To estimate the system of equations in (16), we use macroeconomic time-series
data for the Jordanian economy during the period 1964-95. The sources of our data set
are (1) Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) and (2) International Monetary Fund (International
Financial Statistics). The variables in this chapter are growth rate of real output, gross

domestic saving (both public and private saving), and foreign aid. All data are in nominal
terms and are transformed to real measures using the 1990 implicit GDP deflator.

IX. ESTIMATION RESULTS AND
ANALYSIS 14
We present below selected responses to one-time unit innovation (impulse) to
particular variables. The impulse responses to one-unit innovation in Y3, (foreign aid as a
percentage ofGDP) by Ytt (output growth), Y21 (gross domestic saving as a percentage of
GDP), and Y3, (foreign aid ratio) are depicted in Figures 7, 8, and 9. While the responses
of output growth, domestic saving ratio, and foreign aid to a one-time unit innovation to
domestic saving ratio are depicted in Figures 11, 12, and 13 . Finally, output growth
response, domestic saving ratio response, and foreign aid ratio response are depicted in
Figures 15, 16, and 17, respectively.
Figure 7 presents the response of output growth to one-time unit innovation in
foreign aid ratio. Instantly output growth declines by -1.73%. The period-by-period
responses of output growth are positive for the first six simulated periods and approaches
zero in the other simulated periods. As it can be seen from the figure, foreign aid in its
14

All estimations are programmed in GAUSS.
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aggregated fonn exerted an overall short-run positive dynamic impact on Jordanian
output growth.
Figure 8 depicts the dynamic response of gross domestic saving rate to one-time
unit shock in foreign aid ratio. Initially, domestic saving rate declines by -2.62%, and it
declines even further in the second period by -2.94%. Domestic saving rate starts to
increase after the second period but remains negative in all simulated periods. Clearly, in
the presence of foreign aid and in the case of Jordan, domestic saving rate tends to
decline. The negative statistical relationship between foreign aid and domestic savings
that was found in cross-country studies holds for a single country (Jordan) over time.
Clearly, and as Figure 8 shows, the overall foreign aid ratio (foreign resources) did
substitute for domestic savings (domestic resources) and elicit a substantial long-run
decline in their levels. This dynamic long-run negative impact raises a serious concern for
future Jordanian development and growth once foreign aid comes to a halt. The negative
impact of foreign aid on domestic savings may be attributed to its impacts on interest
rates, prices, government budgetary behavior, and/or public savings. Further investigation
(the concern of the Chapter four) is required to fully explain the channels by which aid
retards domestic savings. Levy (1984), for instance, found out that aid leads to a decline
in domestic savings levels, as its impact on public savings is not fully offset by the
positive impact on output growth.
Figure II presents output growth response to one-time unit innovation in
domestic saving rate. As expected, domestic savings have a positive impact on output
growth, but this impact dissipates after the first five simulated periods, an indication that
domestic savings' effect on output growth is a short-run impact. It is clear that domestic
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saving ' s impact is greater in the initial simulated periods compared to the last ones.
Initially output growth rises by 0.71 % and by 0.53% in the second, and the impact
remains positive until the end of the fourth period. After that it declines until it
approaches close to zero for the rest of simulated periods.
Figure 13 depicts foreign aid ratio response to one-time unit innovation in
domestic saving rate. As the figure shows, aid rate responds negatively to increases in
domestic saving rate, especially in the first simulated periods. This response indicates that
as domestic saving rates increase, the amount of future aid disbursed to Jordan tends to
decline.
The variance decomposition analysis is presented in Tables 5, 6, and 7 and the
corresponding graphs are in Figures 18, 19, and 20. Table 5 (Figure 18) is the variance
decomposition of Jordanian output growth, and shows that the percentage of the variation
in output growth is the highest due to foreign aid innovation (4.83%), and it increases
over time to reach 8.5% in most of the remaining periods. On the other hand, a domestic
saving innovation accounts for 0.82% of the variance, and declines over time to reach
0.12% at the end of the estimated period.
Table 6 (Figure 19) is the variance decomposition of Jordanian gross domestic
saving rate and illustrates that a high percentage of the variance is due to foreign aid
innovation. An aid innovation accounts for 20.52% of the variance in gross domestic
saving rate, and this ratio increases over time to reach 25 .41% and over 23% in most of
the periods.
In the case of foreign aid ratio, Table 7 (Figure 20) presents its variance
decomposition. Output growth explains no more than 1.1% of the variation in foreign aid
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ratio in most estimated periods. On the other hand, domestic saving rate explains 7.8% of
the variance in foreign aid, and the percentage increases to reach more than 9.3% in all
remaining periods.

X. CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to untangle the nature of the dynamic relationship
between the growth rate of Jordanian output, its domestic saving rate, and foreign aid
ratio. The VAR method, the impulse response functions (IRFs), and the variance
decomposition (VDC) suggest, first, foreign aid in its aggregated form had a short-run
positive impact on the growth rate of Jordanian output. Second, foreign aid has a larger
negative tong-run impact on domestic resources (domestic saving). The anti-aid view,
which holds the position that foreign aid exerts negative impacts on domestic savings of
recipient countries, is welt maintained for the case of Jordan.
The above results contrast sharply with those obtained by Hammad's (1981)
study of Jordan, which found out that " ... the statistical results support our previous
conclusions. Foreign aid was neutral with respect to gross domestic savings." These
results match Over's (1975) analysis, which found a positive and significant relationship
between foreign aid and domestic savings in his cross-country analysis. Also, our results
contrast with Chenery and Strout's (1966) study in which a positive relationship between
aid and domestic savings in a cross-country analysis was identified, and with Et Shibty' s
(1984) work in which foreign aid had a negative impact on economic growth in his timeseries analysis of the Sudan economy. Meanwhile, our results contrast partly with
Mosley's (1980) positive conclusion regarding the impact ofaid on growth.
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Even though foreign aid ratio has a positive impact on Jordanian output growth,
nevertheless the decline in Jordanian domestic saving rate as a direct result of foreign aid
presence poses a serious problem on future development and growth. As such,
government policy needs to focus more heavily on mobilizing domestic resources with
the help of foreign resources for the economic transformation of the country. Also,
government should rely more on an efficient allocation policy that, if possible, channels
aid inflows to projects that are highly productive. Thus, output can accelerate and
economic growth and development can be sustained. Infrastructure projects should be
financed mainly with domestic investment (domestic resources), since these projects are
not directly productive. Official foreign aid is the main form of foreign capital inflows to
the country, and its ratio is overwhelming. Jordan should also consider encouraging other
forms, i.e., foreign private investment, that will create more jobs and bring with them
technical abilities and advice. Laws that provide a healthy and safe investment
environment should be enacted to encourage foreign private investment, especially after
the peace treaty in the region has been implemented.
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Table I. The effect of resource inflows on saving or investment (summary ofprevious
research
Regression
No. of
Time-series or Savings or
coefficient
Study
observations
cross-country investment
-0.73
Griffin and Enos
32
s
c
Griffin

32

c

Areskoug

22

T

Weiskopf

38

T

Chenery (JPE)

16

T

Chenery (EDR 148)

90

Chenery (EDR 148)

90

Rahman

31

c
c
c

s

-0.73
+0.40

s
s
s

+0.64

I

+0.11

s

-0.25

-0.23

-0.49

Source: Papanek (I 972)

Table 2. The effect of resource transfers on saving or investment (summary ofprevious
research)

Saving
0.2
(6.0)

Other
flows
0. 19
(2.1)

-0.94
(1.85)

0.029
(0.43)

-0.72
(0.59)

Export growth,
Growth in adult
literacy

OLS, C

-0.049

0.043

-0.02

Export growth,
Growth in adult
literacy

Growth (GOP)

OLS, T

-1.18
(1.06)

Invesunent

OLS, T

0.64
(0.15)

Dependent
variables
Growth (GOP)

Estimation
method 1
OLS, T

Mosley
(1980)

Growth (GOP)

2SLS, C

Mosley
eta/.
(1987)

Growth (GNP)

El Shibly
(1984)

Study
Papanek
(1972)

Foreign
private
investment

Aid
0.39
(5 .8)

-0.09
(2.23)

Invesunent
0.64
Hassan
OLS, T
eta/.
(1995)
1T for time-series analysis and C for cross-section analysis.
Summarized by present author.

Other variables

Export growth

-0.24
(0.617
Per capita
income, Export
growth
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Table 3. Testing/or stationarity using three variables
The Philips-Perron ~
q=l
q=2
q=3

Series
Ylt (Output growth)
Y21 (Gross domestic saving rate)
Y3, (Foreign aid ratio)
2
3

-3 .00

-3.03

Indicates significant at I% level of significance.
Indicates significance at 5% level of significance.
Indicates significance at I 0"/o level of significance.

Table 4. Statistics for choosing the VAR lag length
VAR order (n)

FPE(n)

H-Q (n)

11.27

15.00

11 .27

10.31'

11.33

31.88

10.98'

2

10.74

12.21

76.77

11.51

3

11.23

12.57

193 .8

11.52

4

12.24

12.89

588.9

11.49

5

14.24

13.62

0

•Indicates minimum.

AJC (n)

SBC (n)

11.27

2876

11.87
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Table 5. Variance decomeosition o[_ outeut lJ!:.OWih
Period Output growth
Domestic saving
94.34
0.82
1
2
90.58
1.23
3
90.22
1.23
90.19
1.23
4
5
90.1 9
1.23
90.19
1.23
6
7
90.19
1.23
90.19
1.23
8
90.19
1.23
9
10
90.19
1.23
90.19
11
1.23

Foreign aid
4.83
8.18
8.54
8.58
8.58
8.58
8.58
8.58
8.58
8.58
8.58

Table 6. Variance decomeosilion o[_ domestic saving_
Period
Output growth
Domestic saving
I
0
79.48
2
0.33
74.26
0.26
75.55
3
4
0.23
76.02
5
0.21
76.3
6
0.2
76.46
0.2
76.56
7
0.19
76.63
8
9
0.19
76.67
10
0.19
76.95
0.19
76.97
II

Foreign aid
20.52
25 .54
24.18
23 .74
23 .49
23 .34
23 .24
23 .18
23 .14
23 .18
23 .16

Table 7. Variance decomeosition oLf!Jreif!Jl aid
Period
Output growth
Domestic saving
0
0
2
1.113
7.863
3
1.109
9.144
4
1.105
9.144
1.104
9.336
5
6
1.104
9.369
1.104
9.375
7
9.376
1.104
8
1.104
9.376
9
1.104
9.376
10
1.104
9.376
11

Foreign aid
100
91.02
89.75
89.56
89.53
89.52
89.52
89.52
89.52
89.52
89.52
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Fig. 15 . Impulse response of output growth to one unit innovation to output growth
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CHAPTER3
THE DYNAMIC IMPACT OF FOREIGN AID GRANTS AND FOREIGN
AID LOANS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT:
THE CASE OF JORDAN

I. INTRODUCTION
Since various components of foreign aid may have differential impacts on output
growth and the gross domestic saving rate, we attempt in this chapter to disaggregate
foreign aid into its two main components, foreign aid grants and foreign aid loans, in
order to precisely find out each component's effect. One ofPapanek' s (1972} criticisms
of anti-aid studies was that they combined all capital inflows. Papanek sets the precedent
for later studies by disaggregating aid and other possible capital inflows into their main
components, i.e., foreign aid grants, foreign aid loans, foreign private investment, and
private transfers.

II. METHODOLOGY
A VAR method is used to examine the dynamic relationships between Jordanian
output growth Y It, gross domestic saving rate Y21, foreign aid loans as a percentage of
GDP Y41, and foreign aid grants as a percentage of GDP Y51. All properties described in
Chapter 2 for our three variable V AR will hold for our four-variable VAR.
Again, as preliminary data analysis, the new data series, i.e., foreign aid loans and
foreign aid grants ratios, are checked for stationarity using the Philips-Perron Zt (q) unit
root test statistic. Table 9 contains the results of the unit-root test that was performed with
the use of different values of the lag parameter: q = I, 2, and 3. For both foreign aid loans
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ratio Y41, and foreign aid grants ratio Ys,, the hypothesis of a unit root test can be rejected
at the 5% and I% level of significance, respectively.
Consider the macroeconomic time-series variables, growth rate of real output Yu,
gross domestic saving Y21, foreign aid loans as a percentage ofGDP Y41, and foreign aid
grants as a percentage of GDP Y", respectively, where all are endogenous to the system.
Since the above four variables are jointly determined, a structural simultaneous equation
model relating Yu, Y21,

Y4 ~,

and Ys 1, can be written as:
(3I)

or in a compact form:
B0 Y, = K+B,Y, (L)+U,

(3I ')

where Y1 = (Yu, Y,, , Y41, Ys1)' a (4 x I) vector of the dependent variables at timet,
K

= (

kt, k2 , k3,

~ )'

a (4 x 1) vector of intercept terms, B,

autoregressive coefficients, B 0
effects in the system.

Bo

Y, (L)

=

l

=

=

=

a (4 x4) matrix of

a (4 x4) matrix, which captures the contemporaneous

- B,t
1
-B
31

I

-Bl3
-B,

-B,

I

-B41

-B.,

- B"

-B.,

-B,.

-B,.
-B,4

]

a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L of order P. U,

=

(Uu,U2t,U4t,Us,)' a

(4x 1) disturbance vector which is assumed to be a stationary process with E (U,)
E(U, U,') =0 fort

=

0;

* s ; E( U1 Ut' ) = Q .

The multivariable VAR in Equation 31 incorporates feedback in the system since

Yu,

Y2~

Y4t, and Yst are allowed to affect each other. For example, B12 is the

61

contemporaneous effect of a unit change in
of a unit change in

Ylt

on

Y 21 ,

Y 21

on

Ylt,

B 21 is the contemporaneous effect

and B31 and B 32 are the contemporaneous effects of Y1,

and Y21 on Y3 1, respectively, and so on. Also, note that the U, (error vector terms) are
pure innovations in the dependent vector Y,. Equation 31 is not a reduced form since the
Y1 vectors have contemporaneous effects on each other. We can transform the system in

Equation 31 into a more usable form . Premultiplying both sides of the system in Equation
31 by B 0" 1 allow us to obtain the vector autoregressive (VAR) model in its standard form
(reduced form) :

or

Y, =C +<l>tY,-t +<l>,Y,_, + .. +<I> ,Y,_p +&,

(32')

Equation 15 in a compact form becomes:

Y, = C + <I> ,Y, ( L) +E,
where C

= B01

(33)

K the standard (reduced form) VAR vector intercepts, <I>,

=B01B,

for

s = I, 2, 3, .. .p (the reduced form VAR parameters), andc, = B01U, (the standard
"reduced form" innovation vector)
Assuming that U, is a vector white noise, then

E1

will be recognized as vector

white noise and Equation 33 will be the VAR representation for the dynamic structural
system (DSS) in Equation 31. Thus, a VAR can be viewed as the reduced form of a
general dynamic structural model (GDSM). Note also that the vector error terms
composites of the shocks U, .

E1

are
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III. IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM

To identify the system in Equation 31 , which is underidentified and cannot be
estimated directly due to the feedback inherent in the system (Enders, 1995), we use the
recursive system proposed by Sims (1980) and impose any a priori restrictions which
may be suggested by economic theory to restrict some coefficients in the
contemporaneous parameter matrix, i.e., in a four-variable VAR, 42 - 4/2 restrictions are
needed for identification. Using Sim's recursive system, we restrict 821 = B, 1 = s., = B 32
= B42 =

s., =zero. Given this restriction, Bo and Bo- become:
1

-8,2

8 12

(812 X823 ) + (B13 )

I

(8, )

-8,.]

I

- 8 24

0

-8,.

0

I

(8,2 XB23 X834 ) + ((B,2 X824 ) + (8 13 X834 ) + (814
(82, X8,4 ) + (824 )

0

I

(B,.)

0

0

I

)1

The above restrictions imposed on Bo are explained the same way as in our threevariable V AR from Chapter 2. The only addition to these restrictions is that foreign aid
grants affect foreign aid loans contemporaneously. This restriction implies that recipient
countries in general will seek to obtain foreign aid grants first, to achieve the desired
level of growth rate set a priori (since foreign aid grants require no repayment by
recipient governments). And depending on how successful the recipient government in
raising the necessary funds through grants, the level of necessary loans is determined.
In terms of innovations (shocks), the above restrictions imply the following
innovation system:

63

The above restrictions allow the recovery of the structural (primitive) V AR
parameters. Since the model is just identified, full information maximum likelihood
(FIML) estimates of the structural parameters can be obtained by maximizing the
likelihood function with respect to standard VAR (reduced form) parameters, i.e., <l>, and

L... Then we can use the unique mapping from the estimated reduced form parameters to
recover the structural ones (Hamilton, 1994). Since the objective of this study is to
examine the dynamic impact of foreign aid on both output growth and domestic
resources, the focus will be on the impulse response functions (IRFs) and the variance
decompositions (VDCs).

IV. ISSUES OF VAR LAG LENGTH
The Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwartz Bayesian criterion (SBC),
Akaike final prediction error (FPE), and Hannan-Quinn (HQ) criterion will be used to
identify the appropriate lag length P in Equation 16. The order P is chosen so that the
above-mentioned criteria are minimized. This test criterion is based on several criteria
that have been proposed for estimating the order of a VAR process. Researchers have
suggested minimizing FPE, AIC, SBC, or HQ criterion. These criteria are defined as
follows:
FPE (n) = [(T + n*M + I) I (T- n*M- l)]M det fn
AIC (n) =Log (det (fn) + 2 (M n2 )/T
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SBC (n) = Log (det (En)+ (Log(T)ff) n*M2
H-Q (n) = Log (det (l:n)) + (( 2 log (log (T)))ff) n M 2
where M = number of variables in the system, T

= number of observations in the

sample, n = order of the VAR process (n = I, 2, ... P) , and l:n = an estimate of the
residual covariance matrix obtained with a VAR (n) process.
Clearly, adding additional regressors will reduce log (det (r.)) at the expense of
increasing N. The four above criterion will be estimated for a potential maximum number
of lags, i.e., models with n = 0, I, ... ,Pare estimated with P specified as an upper bound
and a VAR (n) model that minimize the AIC, SBC, FPE, and/or HQ criterion will be
selected.1' (Note that in the procedure the sample size T has to be held fixed, i.e., in each
estimation P observations are treated as presample values.)
The lag structure is identified for each potential number of lags n = 0, .. , P (due to
the degree-of-freedom consideration, the maximum lag length entertained is set to four) .
The above four criteria are estimated for all potential lags entertained and the results are
reported in Table 9. It can be seen from the results that both SBC and FPE criteria are
minimized at with a zero-lag, while both AIC and HQ criteria are minimized at a four-lag
VAR.

To decide which lag model is more appropriate, the maximum chi-square

procedure provides a maximum likelihood test statistic for evaluating whether increasing
the order of a model significantly improves the fit. Sims (1980) suggested a test statistic
measuring improved fit as:
S = (T-K) {Log (det (L,) -log (det (L.)}

15

For more dclailed analysis, see Lutkepohl (1993), Enders (1995), and Judge eta/. (1988).
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where T = number of observations in the sample, Det (L.) & (L) = determinant of the
covariance matrices of the residuals of both the restricted and unrestricted models
respectively, and K = a correction factor to improve small sample properties suggested by
Sims (1980), and it equals the number of parameters estimated per unrestricted equation

(I+Mn,).
This statistic S has an asymptotic chi-square distribution and is used to test the
null hypothesis that adding the (n + 1)o, lag to the system does not significantly improve
the model ' s fit. The test has M 2 (n 1 -no) degrees of freedom. Since estimated S equals
83 .17, which exceeds 79.5 (the 10% chi-squared critical value), the null hypothesis is
rejected. The dynamics are not completely captured by a zero-lag; rather a four-lag V AR
specification seems preferable. Hence, a model with n = 4 is chosen.
Given the assumptions in Equation 31 , that the error vector Ut is white noise, it
follows that

Et

the standard VAR error vector, will have the same stochastic properties,

i.e., the &1 will have a mean zero, E
[ Et

&,' ]

= 0 for t ,. s, and E [Et

Et' ]

[& 1 ] =

0 , E1

E,

are individually uncorrelated, i.e., E

= I:, . Since the standard VAR is symmetric, the least

squares estimator of the standard VAR is consistent and joint estimation techniques do
not increase estimation efficiency.
Because of the presence of many parameters and the difficulty of interpreting
them in a standard VAR, Sims (1980) argued and made popular what has been called
innovation accounting. The informational content of a VAR is better summarized by a
moving average representation. Hence, the next step in this chapter is to investigate the
dynamic response of both growth rate of real output and domestic saving (resources) to
innovations (shocks) in both foreign aid grants and foreign aid loans.
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The standard VAR system is triangulized using Choleski decomposition so that
the innovation (impulses) of the last variable (foreign aid grants) according to our
ordering contemporaneously affects itself and the values of all other variables in the
system, i.e., output growth, domestic saving, and foreign aid loans. While the innovation
of the penultimate variable (variable before the last, i.e., foreign aid loans)
contemporaneously affects itself, it also affects the values of all but the last variable in
the system. In terms of innovations (shocks), the above Choleski decomposition implies
the innovation system mentioned earlier in terms of the four shocks &It, &21, &41, and &s1.

V. ESTIMATION RESULTS AND
ANALYSIS 16
We present below selected responses to one-time unit innovation (impulse) to
particular variables. The impulse responses to one-unit innovation in Ys1 (foreign aid
grants as a percentage ofGDP) by Ylt (output growth), Y21 (gross domestic saving as a
percentage ofGDP), and Y41 (foreign aid loans ratio) are depicted in Figures 23, 24, and
25. The responses of output growth, domestic saving rate, and foreign aid grants ratio to
a one-time unit innovation to foreign aid loans ratio are depicted in Figures 28, 29, and
30. Output growth response, foreign aid loans response, and foreign aid grants response
to a one-time unit innovation to domestic saving are depicted in Figures 33, 34, and 35,
respectively. Finally, the impulse responses to one-time unit innovation to output growth
by domestic saving rate, foreign aid loans, and foreign aid grants are presented in Figures
38, 39, and 40, respectively.

16

All estimations are programmed in GAUSS.
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Figure 23 presents the dynamic response of output growth to the one-time unit
innovation in foreign aid grants ratio. Initially, output growth declines by -2.1%, recovers
in periods 2 and 3, and declines slightly in periods 4 and 5. The period-by-period
responses of output growth are positive in all remaining simulated periods. Clearly, as the
figure shows, foreign aid grants exerted a positive long-run dynamic impact on Jordan' s
rate of output growth.
Figure 24 depicts the dynamic response of gross domestic saving rate to one-time
unit shock in foreign aid grants. Instantly, domestic saving rate declines by -4 .II% and
remains negative in all simulated periods. Clearly, and as the figure shows, foreign aid
grants exerted a severe long-run negative impact on the Jordanian domestic saving rate.
This negative impact shows that foreign aid grants did substitute for domestic saving
(domestic resources) and elicited a substantial decline in their levels. The negative effect
of foreign aid grants on domestic saving rate can be attributed to its possible impact on
government budgetary behavior and its savings. (This issue will be explored in the fourth
chapter.) Also, foreign aid grants may affect the interest rate and overall prices in the
economy.
The response of foreign aid loans to one-time unit innovation to foreign aid grants
is presented in Figure 25 . As the figure indicates, the response is consistent with most
less-developed countries' (LDCs) behavior.

The more foreign aid grants a country

succeeds in obtaining, the less foreign aid loans that it may seek in the future. Clearly, in
the case of Jordan, the increase in foreign aid grants results in a decline of foreign aid
loans as indicated by the negative response of foreign aid loans to foreign aid grants
innovation.
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Figure 28 depicts output growth response to one-time unit innovation to foreign
aid loans. Output growth highly and positively responds to foreign loan innovation in the
first five periods, and declines slightly in periods six, seven, nine, and ten. It starts to
recover in the tenth period and after where it starts to become slightly in the positive
region. It can be seen from the figure that foreign aid loans had a positive shoit-run
dynamic impact on Jordanian output growth, where this impact tends to dissipate after the
sixth simulated period.
Jordanian domestic saving rate response to one-time unit innovation to foreign aid
loans is depicted in Figure 29. Instantly, the domestic saving rate increases by 2.22%,
declines in the second and third period to -1.2% and --{)_5%, and increases afterwards and
remain highly positive in all remaining simulated periods. As the figure shows and in the
case of Jordan, foreign aid loans and domestic savings are complementary inputs as
indicated by the long-run positive dynamic impact foreign aid loan has on domestic
saving rate. The above result contrasts sharply with a similar study on the Jordanian
economy by Almomani (1985), who found that foreign aid loans have a negative but
insignificant impact on growth. Almomani concludes that ".. external borrowing has
either helped to foster the rate of growth in the economy nor [sic] relaxed its savings
constraint" (p. 114).
In Figure 30, the response of foreign aid grants to one-time unit innovation to
foreign aid loans is depicted. As the impulse response function graph shows, foreign aid
grants tend to decline when foreign aid loans rise. Again, as we explained previously,
this result is consistent with most less-developed countries' government behavior.
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Obtaining more loans is a direct result of a decline in foreign aid grants that Jordan
wishes to solicit to achieve the desired rate of growth.
Figures 33, 34, and 35 depict output growth, foreign aid loans, and foreign aid
grant responses to one-time unit innovation to domestic saving rate, respectively. When
foreign aid is decomposed to grants and loans, domestic saving has a neutral impaCt on
output growth compared to its positive impact in our previous model. This result can be
attributed to the severe negative impact that foreign aid grants had on the domestic saving
rates, which we found earlier where grants have depressed and replaced Jordanian
domestic savings. The evidence is even clearer by the high positive dynamic impact
foreign grants had on output growth as shown by Figure 23 . Foreign loans ' response as
shown in Figure 34 shows that as domestic saving rates rise, foreign aid loans tend to
decline. A rising domestic saving ratio is not "rewarded" by aid donors with greater
future loans disbursed on a "matching" principlel 7 Figure 3 5 depicts the response of
foreign aid grants to domestic saving one-time unit innovation. Again and similar to the
case of foreign aid loans, the figure shows a negative dynamic impact from domestic
saving to foreign aid grants and no evidence that a rising domestic saving rate is
"rewarded" by aid donors in the form of greater amounts of future grants.
Figures 38, 39, and 40 show the dynamic response of domestic saving rate,
foreign aid loans, and foreign aid grants to one-time unit innovation to the growth rate of
output. The domestic saving dynamic response in Figure 38 indicates that in Jordan when
the level of income rises, the proportion of income saved tends to decline. Again, in the

17

The "matching" principle reflects donor countries and agencies willingness to reward "match" the
increase in domestic saving rate with greater future aid inflows.
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presence of foreign aid, any additional income tends to increase current consumption at
the expense of current savings. Figures 39 and 40 depict the dynamic responses of both
foreign aid loans and foreign aid grants to one-time unit innovation to output growth,
respectively. Foreign aid loans' dynamic response is highly negative for the initial three
periods, slightly positive for periods five through ten, and then starts to decline
afterwards. The overall impact of an increase in output growth on foreign aid loans is
slightly negative for the simulated periods, an indication that as the economy grows,
donor countries and agencies extend less of future aid in the form of loans to Jordan. It
may also indicate that as the Jordanian economy grows, the Jordanian government
reduces its efforts to obtain more future foreign aid loans.

On the other hand, the

dynamic impact of an innovation to output growth on foreign aid grants is highly positive
(Figure 40). The period-by-period dynamic responses are positive except for periods
three and five. As the growth rate of output increases, donor countries extend additional
grants to Jordan (reward) or the growth may indicate that the Jordanian government
succeeds in soliciting additional foreign aid grants. The serious problem imposed here is
that foreign aid grants exerted a serious negative impact on domestic resources (foreign
aid grants did substitute rather than complement domestic resources). Donors should
extend fewer foreign aid grants; Jordan should solicit to extend the amount of foreign aid
loans rather than grants, if future growth and development are to be sustained.
The variance decomposition analysis is presented in Tables 10, II , 12, 13, and the
corresponding graphs are in Figures 41, 42, 43, and 44. Table 10 (Figure 41) is the
variance decomposition of Jordanian output growth, showing that the percentage of the
variation in output growth is the highest due to foreign aid loans and foreign aid grants at
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55 .99% and 16.04% in the initial period, respectively. Variation due to foreign aid grants
increases to reach a high of 72% and 64% in some periods, while foreign aid grants
explain 23 .9% and a high of26.98% in some periods, while domestic saving explains no
more than 3.9% at most of the variation of output growth. The variance decomposition
of output growth provides us with another evidence of how foreign resources contribute
the most to the variation in the Jordanian output growth, especially the loan component
(another evidence that most of the growth of Jordanian output is mainly attributed to
foreign resources).
Table 11 (Figure 42) is the variance decomposition of Jordanian gross domestic
saving rate, showing that a high percentage of the variance is due to foreign aid grants
and foreign aid loans innovations. Foreign aid grants innovation accounts for 79% of the
variation in domestic savings, and this ratio decreases over time to reach a high of
68.75%. Foreign aid loans account for 10.73% of the variance in domestic saving, and
this ratio increases over time to reach 21 .81%, while output growth explains no more than
3.81% initially and no more than 7% of the variance in domestic saving in most of
remaining periods.
Tables 12 and 13 (Figures 43 and 44) are the variance decomposition of foreign
aid loans and foreign aid grants, respectively. Foreign aid grants innovation accounts for
0.38% of the variation in foreign loan initially, but this ratio increases significantly
afterwards to reach 21% at the end of the period. Domestic savings explain no more than
0.66% of the variance in foreign loans in the first period and that ratio increases slightly
to 1.47% at the end. Output growth explains 2.26% of the variance in loans, and that
percentage increases over time to reach 6. 7%. Finally, 2.5% of the variance in foreign
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aid grants is explained by foreign loans, and that ratio increases over time to reach 18.9%.
Meanwhile, output growth and domestic savings explain 0.01% and 0.00002% in the
variance of grants, respectively, and their respective ratios increase over time to reach
1.49% and 3.98%.

VI. CONCLUSION
This chapter has attempted to explain further the nature of the dynamic
relationship between the two main components of foreign aid, namely, foreign aid loans
and foreign aid grants with the growth rate of Jordanian output, and its domestic saving
rate.

The VAR method, the impulse response functions (IRFs), and the variance

decomposition (VDC) suggest the following.

First, foreign aid grants contribute

positively to the growth rate of Jordanian output. Second, foreign aid loans have a large
dynamic long-run positive impact on Jordanian domestic savings (domestic resources),
which indicates that in the case of Jordan foreign aid, loans and domestic savings
(resources) are complementary inputs. The anti-aid view, which holds the position that
foreign aid exerts negative impacts on the domestic savings of recipient countries, is not
maintained in the case of foreign loans for Jordan. Third, a negative relationship between
foreign aid loans and foreign aid grants exists, i.e., an increase in the levels of foreign aid
loans obtained from donor countries tends to decrease the levels of future foreign aid
grants received. This might be an indication that, one, when Jordan fails to obtain the
necessary funds for growth and development through grants, the government resorts to
foreign public borrowing and vice versa, and two, when Jordan receives additional
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amounts of foreign aid loans, donor countries extend fewer foreign grants. The opposite
will also hold.
Foreign aid grants exerted a positive long-run dynamic impact on Jordan's rate of
output growth, while it also had a severe long-run negative impact on her gross domestic
saving rate as indicated by Figure 24. Thus, if the purpose of foreign aid is to augment
domestic savings, donor countries should not extend foreign aid grants to Jordan as the
evidence indicates that grants will have an adverse effect on the Jordanian domestic
savings rate. Jordan should extend its efforts to solicit more foreign aid loans, if
necessary, and less or none of grants to help its economy to develop and grow. The
serious problem faced by Jordan is that most of its growth in the last thirty years or so can
be easily attributed to foreign resources (particularly foreign grants). That raises the
question of how the economy and domestic resources will respond if foreign aid received
from donors comes to a halt.
Again, the above results contrast with those obtained by Hammad ' s ( 1981) study
of Jordan, which found out that " ... the statistical results support our previous
conclusions. Foreign aid was neutral with respect to gross domestic savings" (p. 154),
and those of Over (1975), who found a positive and significant relationship between
foreign aid and domestic savings in his cross-country analysis. Our results are also in
contrast to Chenery and Strout's (1966) study in which a positive relationship was found
between aid and domestic savings in a cross-country analysis, and with El Shibly's
(1984) study, which found a negative impact of foreign aid on economic growth in his
time-series analysis of the Sudanese economy. Finally, our results contrast partly with
Mosley eta!. (1987), who concluded that aid had a positive impact on growth.
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Even though foreign aid grants and foreign aid loans ratios have a positive impact
on Jordanian output growth, nevertheless the decline in Jordanian domestic saving rate as
a direct result of the presence of foreign aid grants poses a serious problem to future
development and growth. As such, government policy needs to focus more heavily on
mobilizing domestic resources with the help of foreign resources, especially foreign aid
loans for the economic transformation of the country and the augmentation of domestic
resources. Also, government should rely more on an efficient allocation policy that, if
possible, channels aid inflows to projects that are highly productive. Thus, output can
accelerate and economic growth and development can be sustained.

Infrastructure

projects should be financed mainly with domestic investment (domestic resources), since
these projects are not directly productive. Official foreign aid (grants and loans) is the
main form of foreign capital inflows to the country, and its ratio is overwhelming. Jordan
should also consider encouraging other forms, i.e., foreign private investment, that will
create more jobs and bring with them technical abilities and advice. Laws that provide a
healthy and safe investment environment should be enacted to encourage foreign private
investment, especially after the peace treaty in the region has been implemented.
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Table 8. Testing/or stationarity usingjour variables

2
3

Series

The Philios - Perron~
q=3
q=2
q=1

Ya (Output growth)

-5.01

-5.04

-5 .13

Y21 (Domestic saving rate)

-3.303

-3 .902

-3.902

Y4t (Foreign aid loans rate)

-3 .07 2

-2.68 3

-2.89 2

Ys1 (Foreign aid grants rate)

-3 .80

2

-3 .80

2

- 3.89

2

Indicates significance at 1% significance level.
Indicates significance at 5% significance level.
Indicates significance at 10% significance level.

Table 9. Statistics for choosing the VAR lag length with four variables
AIC (P)

SBC (P)

FPE (P)

HQ (P)

13 .08

13 .08'

18.53'

13 .08

II. 71

13 .54

66.53

12.95

2

10.93

13 .90

260.4

12.72

3

11.27

14.63

1358

12.58

4

10.33'

13.49

9427

11 .13'

V AR order (n)
0

*Indicates minimum.

76
Table 10. Variance decome_osition o[_ oulf!!!_l EJ!:_OWih
Period

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Output growth
27.95
22.48
10.98
11.75
12.01
11.84
10.04
10.53
10.09
9.89
10

Domestic saving
0.021
0.256
0.192
1.15
3.51
3.49
3.77
3.67
3.84
3.86
3.93

Foreign aid
loans
55 .99
51.48
76.13
74.26
72.02
66.47
64.28
64.81
62.16
62.35
59.08

Foreign aid
grants
16.04
25 .79
12.7
12.83
12.46
18.19
21.91
20.99
23 .9
23.9
26.98

Table II. Variance decome_osition of_ domestic saving_
Period

Output growth

Domestic saving

Foreign aid
loans

Foreign aid
grants

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

0.00
3.81
7.00
6.51
5.16
5.22
4.83
4.44
4.07
3.75
3.45

10.23
9.57
8.47
6.40
4.46
3.74
3.55
3. 19
2.99
2.82
2.75

10.73
11.86
10.98
24.65
23 .70
20.07
19.78
19.64
19.56
20.25
21.81

79.04
74.74
73 .54
62.43
66.67
70.95
71.83
72.72
73.38
69.62
68.75
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Table 12. Variance decomeosition o[JPreif(ll aid loans
Period

Output growth

Domestic saving

Foreign aid
loans

Foreign aid
grants

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

0.00
2.26
5.52
6.43
6.30
6.28
6.49
6.69
6.71
6.71
6.7

0.00
0.66
0.69
1.30
1.29
1.28
1.37
1.39
1.37
1.38
1.47

99.62
86.58
74.11
71.97
71.08
70.47
70.21
70.00
70.27
70.52
70.46

0.38
10.48
19.67
20.29
21.32
21.97
21.92
21.91
21.64
21.68
21.67

Table 13 . Variance decomposition o[Joreif(ll aid grants
Period

Output growth

Domestic saving

Foreign aid
loans

Foreign aid
grants

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

0.0000
0.0002
0.0800
0.0800
0.8000
0.9700
1.3500
2.1 200
2.8100
3.5800
3.9800

0.00
0.01
0.13
0.37
1.36
1.66
1.94
1.73
1.79
!.59
1.49

0.00
2.52
1.96
1.96
11.21
10.46
12.79
16.37
18 .58
19.17
18.93

100.0
97.46
9782
97.58
86.63
86.91
83 .91
79.77
76.81
75 .65
75 .60

11
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CHAPTER4
FOREIGN AID AND THE GOVERNMENT FISCAL BEHAVIOR:
THE CASE OF JORDAN

I. INTRODUCTION

In most less-developed countries (LDCs), the government plays a considerable
role in the planning as well as the implementation of most development projects.
Evidently, a large proportion of foreign capital, especially foreign aid, is channeled
through the public sector. The rising level of public expenditures in Jordan has been
fueled mainly by capital inflows from both public and private sources abroad and by
mobilizing domestic resources through taxation and local borrowing. Recently,
government's development efforts and its effectiveness have been cast in doubt. Critics
argue that foreign aid inflows have resulted in increased public and/or private
consumption rather than increased investment and that they have contributed less or none
to growth. Various researchers (Papanek, 1973; Weisskoff, 1972; El Shibly, 1984) found
evidence suggesting a leakage out of aid to consumption. Others (Griffin, 1970; Heller,
1975) suggest that the higher tax burden has been squandered on non-productive forms of
public spending.
The major work in the literature regarding this issue is Heller's (1975) paper, in
which he postulates a maximizing policy maker and derives consistent behavioral
equations in order to estimate the impact of foreign aid on various government
expenditures and revenues. One problem with Heller' s and other earlier studies is that
the data used are a pooled cross section of different countries with a few time-series

91
observations. Hence, to draw any valid conclusions about a single country from such data
may be questionable. In this chapter, we employ a similar framework as Heller (1975)
and use consistent time-series data for Jordan. Furthermore, the full system of
simultaneous equations is estimated using a three-stage least square procedure, which
will be discussed later.
In this chapter, the effectiveness of foreign aid in meeting the development efforts
in Jordan is analyzed in a model which decomposes the effect of various foreign aid
components on alternative aggregate public expenditures and domestic revenues. This
study will shed some light on how the fiscal behavior of one developing country may
compound its debt repayment problem and eventually reach a debt crisis. This model will
distinguish between types of foreign aid (grants vs. loans).

II. METHODOLOGY
One approach to the understanding of the fiscal behavior of the public sector is to
assume that it reflects the actions of a set of public decision-makers (i.e., Council of
Ministers).

The government attempts to maximize its own welfare in the face of

budgetary constraints, i.e., the alternative uses of public resources, and will use foreign
capital inflows, especially foreign aid, in the pursuit of that objective.
Following Heller (1975), Mosley eta/. (1987), and Otim (1996), for any period t,
we assume the following utility function of the decision-maker:

U = F (18 , Gc. G,, T, B. A)

(34)

where U = welfare of public-sector decision-makers, 18 = public investment expenditures
for development purposes, G, = public socioeconomic expenditures, G, = public civil
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(administrative expenditures), T = total tax revenues collected by the government (it
includes both direct and indirect taxes), B =public borrowing from domestic sources; and
A = total net foreign grants received by the government

A~,

plus total net foreign loans to

the government from all sources A2 .
Public expenditures can be decomposed into three main categories: civil
consumption in the public sector (G,), socioeconomic consumption (G,), and public
investment (Ig). Civil consumption includes public sector spending relating to the
fundamental needs of the state to function and maintain its political existence. It includes
expenditures, capital and recurrent, for government administration, diplomatic and
international affairs, and preserving internal and external security (police and armed
forces) . Also, a fraction is for subsidies and transfers to households and nongovernmental agencies. Socioeconomic expenditures include all current non-capital
spending for socioeconomic ends, including spending on schools, hospitals, and health
centers, for maintenance of roads and communication networks. Public investment
expenditures, Ig, are the public sector's contribution to gross capital formation (i.e.,
buildings and construction, transport equipment, agricultural mechanization, etc.).
Theoretically, it might be expected that both G, and Ig have an impact on growth, but
from a policy-maker's perspective, G, is usually not regarded as investment but instead as
a form of consumption with no developmental impacts.
Public expenditures can be financed by two means, domestic and/or foreign
sources. Domestic sources will include taxation and domestic borrowing. However,
increases in taxes may become increasingly difficult for the public decision-maker to
advocate both because of the increased administrative difficulty of collecting the taxes
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and the economic cost and political resistance found in low-income countries such as in
Jordan. Since the choice of a tax rate is a policy instrument available to public decisionmakers, it follows that T is endogenous. Borrowing locally constitutes an alternative of
resource mobilization, but it will also yields disutility to the public decision-maker. The
net increase in the public sector's long-term domestic-debt is traditionally seen as fiscal
irresponsibility if it occurs in more than limited amounts and unless it is used to finance
public investment. Finally, capital inflows from abroad to the public sector are assumed
to be exogenous. These inflows are controlled by aid-giving agencies, which are
motivated by political and economic factors. Although it is possible for a government to
reject aid impaired by heavy political and economic implications, we shall assume, at
least for the case of Jordan, that this is uncommon. A further plausible assumption is that
the government is not in a position to significantly increase the level of capital inflows
beyond what is actually offered.
The welfare function is defined as a "loss function" that is quadratic in deviations
of the various "intermediate targets" from their desired values. The further the variables
stray from their targets, the lower the level of public utility. In microeconomics, this is
analogous to risk-averting behavior involving choice under uncertainty. Thus, the public
policy-makers are assumed to maximize the following quadratic objective function:

/15 (G,- G;)- (~ )(G,- G;) 2 - [J, (T- T")(fl. )(T- J")2
2

-A (B- B")- (/1, 0)(B- B")2
2

(35)
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where the variables are as defined previously,

f3.

~

0, and asterisks denote desired values

of intermediate targets. These targets are the expenditures and receipts that policy-makers
plan to meet, and deviating from them is undesirable.
We now tum to formulate the economic and institutional constraints to which this
maximization problem is subject.

The first constraint is budgetary. All government

expenditures must, one way or another, be financed. The simplest way to formulate this
constraint is by balancing all outflows by inflows:

T+B+ A, +A, =1, +Gc +G,

(36)

However, in most LDCs, as is the case in Jordan, it is uncommon for recurrent
government expenditures (G, + Gc) to be financed by domestic borrowing. Hence, we
postulate both of these expenditures to be mainly financed from tax revenues and aid
receipts alone:

Gc +G,

=P

13

T + P14 (A 1 )+P15 (A 2 )

(37)

Thus,
I ,= B+ (l - p 13 )T+(I - P,.)A, + (I-/3, , )A 2

(38)

where 0 <;; pif <;; I, i = I, 2, 3, and j = 3, 4, 5. The level of (I - p13) reflects the
government's belief as to the maximum it can realistically "save" from the current
budget, and that enters as a constraint on its decision, but it is not an additional policy
variable. On the other hand, (I -

P14) and (I - p,,) are the fractions of foreign grants (A 1)

and foreign loans (A2) going to government investment, respectively. The second
constraint (38) allows for the possibility that lg, can be financed partly by taxes and
domestic borrowing as well as by different types of foreign aid. Also, the first constraint
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(3 7) allows for foreign aid not used in public investment to go towards socioeconomic
and civil expenditures in addition to the portion of taxes that is not invested. As a result, a
trade-off exists between 18, and both G, and G,, and, more generally, between more and
less productive resources (in terms of fostering growth) of all government revenues. The
direction of the impact of foreign aid on G,, G,, 18 , and T will be evaluated once ·the
parameters of the model are specified and estimated.
Based on planning behavior of most developing countries, as is the case with
Jordan policy-makers, we assume that the desired values of target variables G',, G',,

l'g,

T', and B' are derived from observable macroeconomic data according to the following
relationships:

1; = a

10

+ a, ,I,_,_, +a,Y, +a" Y, _, + a14

1,_,_ + a, W, + &
1

11

T' =a20 + a 21 T,_, +a, Y, _, +a, M, _, + a,.W, + &2,

(39)
(40)

G; =a30 +a31 G,_,_, +a, Y,_1 +a33 W, + &3,

(41)

G; = a40 + a4 1G,_,_, + a42 Y, +&4 ,

(42)

B' =0

(43)

where Ip is investment spending by the private sector, Y is real gross domestic product,
Mt-1 is lagged imports, and W1 is a war time dummy variable, which captures periods of

turmoil, political unrest, and war for the Jordanian state. The rationale . behind each
specification is as follows. The target level of public investment

I'8 is

derived mainly

from, first, a target rate of growth for the economy's GDP (most developmental plans in
LDCs set a target rate a priori, as the case in Jordan). Second, an assumption about
current period's level of private investment and finally, an assumption about the capital-
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output ratio, where public investment is planned in order to provide the "residual" needed
to derive up the actual growth rate to its target level. In a Harrod-Domar framework, we
can postulate that for a given target growth rate,

r" 8 will

be related positively to output in

previous periods, and inversely to private investment (I8 and Ip can have a positive
relationship if such investments are complementary in technology). Finally, it is expected
that in periods of political unrest and wars, this targeted level will decline, since the state
will allocate extra funds to higher priorities, i.e., military and internal security spending.
Target level of tax revenue T' is derived from estimates of the two bases for
taxation, income and international trade (imports). Targeted taxes are expected to be
adversely affected in periods of war. The desired level of civil consumption target G'c
consists in normal years of a standard increment on its last period's value and previous
level of income, but it is expected to take a sharp upward jump in years when the country
is at war. Similarly, the socioeconomic spending target G', is planned to grow in
proportion to previous income and its past values. Finally, it is assumed that ex ante, the
target for domestic borrowing B', is equal to zero. This would not preclude a positive
level of domestic borrowing.

III. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK

From Equations 35, 37, and 38, the following Lagrangian function is formulated : ·

MaxL=flo +fJ..(Jg

-1;)-(~)(/g -I;)' +{J,(G, -G;)-(~)(G, -G;)'

+ {J,(G,- G;)- (~ )(G,- G;)'- fJ.,(T- T")- fl. (B- B')
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- (~0 )(B - B')' + A,{l

8

- B - (1 - A ,)T-(1- A 4 )A, - (1-A,)A,}
(44)

where At and A2 are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with constraints (4) and (5),
respectively. From Equation 44, the frrst-order conditions are:
8L

-

iJI,

= A-P, (I,-I;)+A, = O

(45)

iL

ru, =/3,- fJ. (G,-G;) +A..,= O
iL
8I' =A - /l,(T - T') -A, (I- A,)-A..,/3, = 0
iL
i13

=- /39 -/3, 0 (B-B')+A,

=0

iL

BA, =1, - B - (1 - fJ, )T-(1 - fJ,.)A, - (1-A, )A, = 0

(47)

(48)

(49)

(50)

Letting B' = 0, substituting the As and rearranging the first order conditions, we get:

(52)
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(53)

T = [(ft, :l(A, )- (/J, ) + P. (!- P")] +
(/J")(!J. )
[(/J, +PIO(!-p"p]
((/J, +PlO (J-f3.. ,)1XGc -G;)

. (!J, + P,.(J - fJ..,)'XT')

f3..o

+

(54)

f3..o

+
(fJ, + f3.. 0 )[(I -

fJ..,XT) +(I - fl..) A, +(I- fJ..,)A,]

Let:

(/3, -

<I>
I=

p,)

(ft. +P.)
p,

<I> -

;

2-

___11__
(!J. +P.)

=fJ.., ; p, =P,. ; p, = fJ.. ,

(55)
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and

<1>-~8 -

p, +A.

Then our structural equations to be estimated are:

G, = <l> 1 -(I - <l> 2 )G;+<l> 2 G; +p, (l - <l> 2 )T

+p2 (l-<l>,)A , -p, (l-<1> 2 }A2

(56)

(57)
(58)

18 = <1>7 +(1 - <l>,)I; +<1>8[(1- ,q)T+(I -p,)A, - (I- p,)A,]

(59)

V. DATA AND ESTIMATION
To estimate Equations 39 through 42, and the system of structural Equations 56,
57, 58, and 59 (simultaneous equations), we use macroeconomic time-series data for the
Jordanian economy during the period 1964-95. The sources for the data set are (I) The
Central Bank of Jordan, (2) International Monetary Fund, and (3) the United Nations
National Accounts Statistics. All data are expressed in logarithms, and as preliminary
data analysis, all series are first checked for stationarity. The Philips-Perron test for a unit
root is performed on each series and the results are reported in Table 14. Structural
Equations 56 through 59 are estimated using nonlinear three-stage least square
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(NL3SLS), following guidelines in Judge eta/. (1988). By fitting regression Equations 39
though 42, the target values of the dependent variables are derived by using the ordinary
least square (OLS) procedure. To test for the presence of autocorrelation, the BreuschGodfrey test, which is a Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test, is applied.18 On the basis of the
above test, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation for Equations 39, 40,
41, and 42 at the 1% significance level. A nonlinear three-stage least square (NL3SLS) .
procedure using a GAUSS-NEWTON algorithm estimates the simultaneous equation
system, Equations 56 through 59. To briefly summarize the nonlinear least square ·
estimation and the above algorithm, we consider a simple single parameter model, where
we can generalize the results to several parameter cases. Consider the following model:

Y,

= j(X,.B)+U,
(60)

where B 2 = B;, U1 are independent and identically distributed random variables with
E(U,) = 0, and E(U U') = cr2 , Y1 is the dependent variable, and X1 is the explanatory
variable, Xu and Xa, respectively. The nonlinear least square estimate for B will be the
value ofB that minimizes the residual sum of squares R(B):
T

R(B) = ~)Y,- j(X,,B)]'

(61)

t: l

dR(B)
the minimum value ofBoccurs where~= 0:

dR
T
(
df(Xl'B) )
-d =-2I[Y,-j(X,.B)] dB
=0 .
'B
1=1

18

For more details on the Breusch-Godfrey test (LM), see Green ( 1990).

(62)
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Solving Equation 62, we find that the least squares estimate b must satisfy:

T

-I:X"Y' =0

(63)

t =l

Equation 63 is a cubic equation in the parameters B, and its solution yields three different
possible results. The nonlinear least square estimate b is the solution, which minimizes
the residual sum of squares R(B), which is known as the global minimum. The primary
difficulty lies in: (I) finding an analytical expression that solves Equation 63 and an
estimate for b, and (2) the existence of three possible solutions that satisfy Equation 63
since it is a cubic function. Generally, it is not possible to use the first-order conditions
for a minimum to derive an analytical expression for the nonlinear least square estimator.
To find a single nonlinear least squares estimate b for the single parameter B, a numerical
method must be used . One possible procedure is to use the GAUSS-Newton algorithm.
This algorithm begins with some initial value for B, which might be a guess or can be
suggested by an estimate of an approximate linear model. The sum of squares function
R(B) is computed for such an initial value. Then, we change the initial parameter value
in a direction that will lead to a further reduction in R(B) . A new parameter value is
found and the process is repeated until a point is reached where a change in the parameter
will not reduceR (B) any further. At this point the algorithm has converged. The question
that arises is whether this point is a global or a local minimum. The usual and best way of
increasing the probability of locating the global minimum is to carry out the process with
as many different initial values. If convergence to the same point occurs over time, there
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is a good chance that the global minimum has been reached . The algorithm main goal is
to find a value ofB that satisfies Equation 63 . Replacing/(X., B) by a first-order linear
Taylor series approximation and beginning with some initial value for B, i.e., 81 , the
first-order approximation can be written as:
(64)
where R ( B ) = df <X " B > evaluated at B 1, and R. (8 2) would be evaluated at 82, and so
I

dB

I

on. Using this notation and substituting the Taylor series approximation in Equation 64
into the residual sum of squares function in Equation 61 yields:

(65)
where /u

Y,(B.) =

=

f

(X.,

81),

fa

would

be f

(X,,

82),

and

so

on,

and

Y, -In+ R,(B1 ) .B1 • Hence, for a given value of 81, both Y,(B1 ) and R.(Bt)

are observable. The residual sum of squares in Equation 65 can be viewed as that which
needs to be minimized to find the least squares estimate forB from the linear model:
(66)
and the least squares estimate from Equation 66 is given by:
T_

B, =

IY,(BI) . R,(BI)
-'=1
=,_1--,T
;:------

(66' )

IR,(Bt) 2
t=l

(67)
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where

R(B1 ) =

R1(B1 )

Y; (BI)

R,(B, )

Y, (BI)
and

f(B 1 )

=

Y,.(BI)

The above shows that if we begin by an initial value or a guess for B, i.e., B 1, and
approximate the functionJi 1 by a first-order Taylor series approximation around B 1, then
a second estimate for B, i.e., B2, is found by applying least square a new linear model as
in Equation 66. We can continue this process using B2 to construct another linear model,
which will lead the least squares estimate B3 ; continuing the process leads to a sequence
of estimates B4, Bs, ..., and the (n+ I )t, from the n estimate can be written as:
B,. 1 = [R(B,)']-1R(B ,) 'Y(B.)
= [R(B.)'R(B,)J-1R(B,)'[Y - f(X,B,) + R(B,) . B,
= B, +[R(B.)R(B,)] -1R(B,) '[Y - f(X, B,)]

(68)

where f( X,B) = [f(X,, B),j(X2, B), .. . ,f(XT, B)] , and the first-order condition for a
minimum can be written in matrix notation as:
R(B)'[Y- f(X,B)]

=0

(69)

If two successive estimates are equal, i.e., B•., = B., it follows from Equation 68 that
R(B.)'[Y-fCX,B.)]=O . Hence B. satisfies the necessary condition for a minimum.
Thus, starting with an initial value B 1, and repeatedly applying Equation 68 until
convergence occurs, we have reached a solution that satisfies the first-order conditions in
Equation 69. The solution may converge to a local rather than a global minimum. One
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possibility of locating the global minimum, or at best increasing the probability of
identifying it, is carrying out the process for a number of different starting values. If
different starting values lead to a different minimum, the one with the least residual sum
of squares is the solution to the nonlinear squares estimate.

VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 15 presents OLS regression estimates obtained in fitting the equations of
the target values of the dependent variables. These equations fit well as the adjusted
coefficient of determination (R 2 ) suggest. The coefficients for the two lagged
consumption expenditures G, and G, are positive and statistically significant at the 1%
level as expected. These coefficient estimates are consistent with policy-makers'
behavior in the third world in general and in Jordan in particular. Also, expected levels of
lagged real output Y, are positive and significant in both G, and G, equations at the 5%
and I 0% levels, respectively. This is another indication that in planning the targeted level
of both of these expenditures, the previous year's level of income is important. On the
other hand, the war dummy variable is insignificant in the G, equation, an indication that
war has no impact at least in the case of Jordan at the targeted G, expenditures.
The results of the OLS estimates of the target values of the two consumption
expenditures are also similar to those obtained for the two target values tax, T, and
government investment, 18 . A positive and significant coefficient at the 10% level is
found for lagged GDP, and a positive and significant coefficient is found for lagged
imports, which are the two main bases for taxation in Jordan. This is an indication that an
increase in both real income and imports leads to higher target taxation for increasing

105
revenues. Also, a negative and significant coefficient at the I 0% level is found for the
war dummy variable, another indication that periods of war and political instability in
Jordan lead to a decline in target taxation efforts.
Finally, the estimated coefficients for the target value of government investment
are also statistically significant at the I% and 5% level of significance. Both lagged
government investment and lagged GDP are positive and significant as expected. Note
that the coefficient on lagged private investment is positive and statistically significant at
the 5% level of significance. This is an indication that an increase in government
investment does not crowd out private investment and vice versa. In Jordan an increase in
government investment leads to higher private investment spending. This may be
explained by the possibility of a positive linkage between government and private
investment if both are technologically complementary. A positive and significant
coefficient at the I% level of significance on the dummy war variable indicates that in
periods of war the Jordanian government pulls funds from investment towards other ends.
In this particular case, the reduction in government investment due to wartime can be

explained by a reduction in the tax efforts in the tax equation due to the same reason.
Table 16 provides our estimates for the budgetary impact of foreign aid grants and
loans to Jordan. The crucial budget constraint parameters showing both consumption
expenditures (Gc and Gs) responses to increases in tax revenues, grants, and loans are p 1,
p2, and p3, respectively. The proportion of tax revenues that remain in the Jordanian
current budget as shown by Pt is 140%, and that coefficient is significant at the I% level
of significance. This implies that in Jordan, tax revenues are not used to finance any
investment projects, and when the tax burden is raised there is a tendency to pull funds
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out of investment projects to supplement other consumption expenditures (p 1 > I). It is
important to note, however, the possibility that p 1 is unity because of foreign aid; if these
additional resources (aid) are nonexistent, the Jordanian government may indeed finance
public investment from current taxation. The results on foreign aid grants indicate that
50% of total official grants received by the Jordanian government leak into consumption
as shown by the significant coefficient, p2, at the I% level. On the other hand, the foreign
aid loans coefficient, p2, is insignificant, which implies that foreign aid loans do not have
any significant effect on government consumption, while domestic resources and foreign
aid grants are used to finance such consumption expenditures.
The tax coefficients indicate that the presumption that domestic resources (tax and
non-tax revenues) are usually used for the daily expenses of running a country is true and
holds for Jordan.

Thus, in the presence of foreign aid, all tax revenues leak into

consumption. On the other hand, almost half of the grants received by the government
leak into consumption, which can be explained by the fact that grants are considered to be
outright gifts from donor countries that entail no future repayment. Finally, all loans are
used to finance public investment, which can be explained by (!) tying conditions to
specific projects that allow for no fungubility in loans, and (2) loans are to be paid back,
which requires future stream of income from those loans to enable the government to do
so in the future. The differential impact of loans and grants is not surprising. Grants have
a more stimulative impact on government consumption, and a weaker one on government
investment. The above results contrast sharply with those obtained by Otim's (1996)
cross-country study of three low-income Asian countries and mildly with Gang and
Khan's ( 1991) study based on Indian data. Otim' s ( 1996) study finds the proportion of
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tax revenues (p 1) that remain in the current budget to be -0.37, the share of foreign aid
grants (p2 ) that remain in the current budget to be 0.344, and the share of foreign aid
loans allocated to government consumption to be 0.18. Gang and Khan (1991) find the
proportions of the three budget constraint parameters p 1, p2 , and p3 , to be 1.08, -0.79, and
-0.03, with the last two to be insignificant where they conclude that foreign aid grants
and loans do not have any statistically significant impact on government consumption.
On the other hand, our results coincide more to those of Heller' s (1975) cross-country
study data of nine Mrican countries. He finds the proportion of tax revenues (p 1) that
remain in the current budget to be 78%, the share of grants allocated to government
consumption (p2 ) to be 65%, and the share of foreign aid loans !lllocated to government
consumption to be insignificant.
The cj>, tell us something about the functioning of the Jordanian public sector.

<!> 2

relate public socioeconomic consumption to both the revenue side and targeted
expenditures of the current budget. For targeted expenditures, a positive and significant
<!> 2

at the 1% level of significance implies that setting a higher targeted G, leads the

Jordanian public sector to proportionally allocate more funds to G, and less to G,. Also,
it implies that by setting a higher targeted G,, less will be devoted to G, (since G, and G,
are competing expenditures in the government budget). On the revenue side,

<!> 2

indicate

what proportion of foreign aid and taxes that go to G, and G,. For example, out of the
50% of grants that go to consumption, 35.5% go toG, while only 14.5% go toG,. Also,
a higher proportion of tax revenue is pulled out for G,(J04%) compared to that pulled out
for G, (40%).
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4> 4 and

q,$ explain the link between targeted and actual expenditures and the tax

burden. By assuming that targeted civil and administrative expenditures,

c; , exceed the

actual expenditures, Gc, with PI greater than one and 4>• greater than zero, indicates the tax
burden is increased, since the authorities need to increase taxes to cover unintended
expenditures. On the other hand, if

c; is

less than Gc, with PI greater than zero and

positive cp 4, the tax burden is reduced . q,$ close to one (0.94) indicates that in the case of
Jordan higher targeted taxes translate directly to actual taxes by the authorities. A positive
and significant 4>6 at the I% level of significance indicates that the presence of foreign aid
reduces the public sector taxation effort. This result again contrasts sharply with Otim ' s
(1996) and Gang and Khan ' s (1991) results in this regard. Finally, the estimate cp 8
indicates that public investment is closely related to targeted investment decisions and not
so much by revenues since it is not significantly different from zero.

Vl CONCLUDING REMARKS
The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of foreign aid grants and
loans on a developing country (Jordan). The limitations of earlier studies that used pooled
cross-section data and inappropriate methods of estimation motivated this work. We have
used time-series data for a single country, i.e., Jordan, and attacked the estimation
problem by employing a method of estimation for a system of simultaneous equation
with non-linearity in the parameters. The results we found contrast with earlier work
regarding the impact of foreign aid (grants and loans) on the fiscal behavior. The results
confirm that foreign aid affects both the revenue and the expenditure side of the
Jordanian government budget. On the consumption side, we found out that foreign aid
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grants are treated as an increase in income, and given positive income elasticity in the
public sector, consumption expenditures will rise. On the other hand, foreign aid loans
have no significant impact on government consumption so that the income elasticity with
respect to foreign aid loans is said to be very close to zero. Thus, if the purpose of aid is
to generate higher investment levels, donor countries ought to extend more foreign aid
loans to Jordan than grants since loans lead to more investment and hence more future
growth and income. The results also indicate that domestic tax revenue is used to finance
both civil and socioeconomic consumption expenditures, and in the presence of foreign
aid grants and loans, an increase in taxes leads to an increase in consumption and vice
versa. Hence, the propensity to consume out of additional taxes is much higher in Jordan
in the presence of foreign aid. Accordingly, any increase of consumption in Jordan will
be financed largely out of increased taxes and out of foreign aid grants and not out of
loans as indicated earlier.
The results also show that in the presence of foreign aid, Jordan ' s public sector
reduces its efforts to collect taxes. Hence, countries extending foreign aid to Jordan
should stress the necessity of programs for mobilizing government saving by either
raising the ratio of tax collection to GDP (the tax ratio), through reforms in the tax
structure or via increases in existing tax rates. This can be achieved if donors to Jordan
utilize tax ratios and tax effort indices as main indicators of national commitment where
more aid is possible only if that commitment by Jordan is met.
Given the above, the Jordanian government needs to focus heavily on mobilizing
domestic resources and on increasing its tax efforts. Also an efficient allocation policy is
called for that channels foreign aid inflows to projects that are highly productive if the
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purpose is to increase investment and raise future income. Additional research in this area
can be conducted by further isolating the effects of foreign aid into short-tenn versus
long-term, and multilateral versus bilateral.

III
Table 14. Testing_f!!r stalionariiJ:. using_ 17 variables

Series

The Philil)s- Perron z, (g) test
q=3
q=2
q =I

Gc

3.76

1.76

2.03

G,'

2.27 2

1.883

3.24 1

T•

2.3 I 2

2.79 1

3.03

I·

•

-2.10

-2.093

-2.10

GDP

2.13 2

2.38 2

-2.59

-2.59

2.48 2
-2.663

1.793

1.63 3

1.52

T

4.76 1

2.31 2

3.18

M

1.962

2.102

2.402

Gc

2.75 1

1.43

1.50

G,

2.86

1.763

2.05 2

A,

-2.95 2

-2.903

-2.46

A2

-4.08 1

-4.002

-4.162

1

Indicates significance at I% significance level.
Indicates significance at 5% significance level.
3 Indicates significance at I 0% significance level.
2

1

1
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Table 15. OLS reEI!:_ession estimates o[_ the targ_et values o[_ the dee.endent variables
De12endent variables
Regressors
G,
lg
T
G,
Constant
3.69
-1.36
-0.26
-1.23
(125)
(1 .03)
(0.83)
(0.73)
GDPt-1

-0.51
(0.20)

lg, t-1

0.64
(0.09)

lp,t-1

0.34
(0.14)

0.32
(0.28)

Tt-l

0.45
(0.23)

M.-1

0.3 1
(0. 13)

0.36
(0.19)

G~H

0.59
(0.14)

Gc, t-1

w,

0.61
(0.14)
-0.46
(0.10)

-0.14
(0.07)

JP
0.87
0.95
Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficients.

-0.05
(0. 10)
0.82

0.89
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Table 16. Nonlinear three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimates of the fiscal impact of
foreign aid grants and loans to Jordan (number of observations = 30)

Parameter

PI

Coefficient
1.44

Standard error
0.04

t "Ratio"
35.54

Approximate
prob. > It I
0.000

P2

0.50

0.04

11.5

0.000

PJ

-0.01

0.01

-0.55

0.576

4>1

-0.04

0.03

-1.13

0.257

$2

0.71

0.03

23.1

0.000

4>3

0.11

0.1 4

0.79

0.428

$4

0.08

0.09

0.98

0.324

4>s

0.94

0.02

33 .7

0.000

4>6

0.17

0.07

2.25

0.026

4>7

0.05

0.05

1.13

0.257

4>s

0.18

0.06

2.69

0.008
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CHAPTERS
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The impact of foreign resources (foreign aid) on the growth and development of
recipient countries, the least to say, is controversial. In the 1950s, the United States, a
capital surplus nation, started foreign assistance programs to help many LDCs to grow. In
the same period, many LDCs resorted to foreign capital acquisition, especially foreign
aid, to achieve desired rates of output growth. The failure of foreign aid to bring about
prosperity and growth to some LDCs led to a series of debates between economists and
policy-makers regarding the impact of foreign resources on growth and development.
Many empirical studies were conducted and the results obtained were not
conclusive, whether those studies used cross-country or time-series approaches. Needless
to say, most of the literature cited previously focused on a static relationship rather than a
dynamic one among aid, domestic savings, and output growth. Since we have found that
foreign resources (foreign aid) exerted an overall negative impact on domestic resources
(domestic saving) in Jordan, the results obtained raise the concern over the possible
recovery of domestic saving once foreign aid ceases. If we assume that the domestic
saving ratio will recover once foreign aid is withdrawn, then it would be difficult to argue
that foreign resources could have a harmful effect on growth.
If foreign aid did reduce the domestic saving ratio (as we have found), and if that
ratio recovers instantly, aid-receiving Jordan could hardly be worse off, in a sense of
having a lower growth rate as a direct result of obtaining foreign aid. On the other hand,
if the public sector raises its consumption expenditures to unsustainable levels, lowers its
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taxes or the effort to collect taxes, and relies heavily on foreign resources as an available
substitute to finance public expenditures, aid-receiving Jordan will be worse off. In the
case of Jordan, we found that the Jordanian public sector relaxed its efforts to collect
taxes, and in the presence of foreign aid the Jordanian government had less incentive to
raise taxes as one way of increasing the domestic saving ratio. This by itself may lead the
government to delay some necessary measures such as privatization, subsidy removal,
and a possible restructure of the government personnel and behavior. Examples of the
above may be reduction in the number of civil servants, reduction in the size of the army,
and more importantly a reduction in government conspicuous spending such as acquiring
ostentatious buildings and expensive luxury automobiles for public officials. Since aid
prompted the public sector to increase most, if not all, of the above-mentioned
expenditures, the country is stuck with these actions long after aid is terminated and the
country will consume a larger share of the budget at the expense of public savings.
Because the above expenditures were originated in a period when foreign resources paid
the bill, these expenditures could become a serious drag on the economy after donor
support comes to a halt.
By focusing on the issue of the relative contribution of domestic resources versus
foreign resources in promoting economic growth in Jordan, it appears that foreign
resources performed better than domestic ones in promoting growth. With respect to the
contribution of the components of foreign aid, namely, foreign aid grants and foreign aid
loans, we found that both grants and loans contributed positively to output growth, with
foreign aid loans being the factor behind fostering a short-run positive impact on output
growth, while foreign aid grants fostered a long-run positive impact on growth. We also

II6
found that foreign aid grants and domestic resources are substitute inputs (grants exerted
a negative long-run dynamic impact on domestic savings), while foreign aid loans and
domestic resources are complementary inputs (loans exerted a positive long-run dynamic
impact on domestic savings). In the case of Jordan, it appears that loans are more
effectively utilized while grants are not, since grants need not be repaid. It is possible that
the government authorities may have allowed various administrative slack and perhaps
tolerated a greater degree of corruption in grant utilization.
We also found the following: (I) Foreign aid (grants and loans) affects the
revenue and the expenditure side of Jordanian government budget; (2) foreign aid grants
are treated as an increase in income and, given a positive income elasticity in the public
sector, the presence of foreign grants will raise public consumption expenditures at the
expense of public investment; (3) foreign aid loans have no significant impact on
government consumption expenditures, so that income elasticity with respect to foreign
loans is said to be zero; (4) domestic tax revenues are used to finance public consumption
expenditures and not public investment; (5) in the presence of foreign aid grants and
loans, an increase in taxes leads to an increase in public consumption expenditures and
vice versa.

Hence, any increase in public consumption will be financed mainly by

increased taxes and foreign grants; (6) the presence of foreign resources prompted the
Jordanian government to reduce its efforts to collect taxes; and (7) the negative statistical
relationship between foreign grants and public savings does hold for Jordan.
The government of Jordan may consider: (I) focusing more heavily on mobilizing
domestic resources with the help of foreign resources, especially foreign aid loans that
helped augment domestic resources of Jordan, for the economic transformation of the
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country; (2) relying more on an efficient allocation that if possible, channels aid inflows
to projects that are highly productive; (3) financing infrastructure projects mainly with
domestic resources (domestic investment), since most of these projects are not directly
productive; (4) encouraging other forms of foreign capital inflows to Jordan, i.e., foreign
private investment, which will bring technical abilities and advice as well as the
possibility of creating more domestic jobs; (5) enacting laws that provide a healthy and
safe investment environment to encourage both foreign and domestic investment; and (6)
increasing its efforts to force some institutional changes and taking some measures that
may seem controversial (privatization, restructuring of government personnel, subsidy
removal, reduce or eliminate government conspicuous spending, etc.).
Finally, countries extending foreign aid to Jordan should consider and stress the
necessity for mobilizing government savings by either raising the ratio of tax collection
to GDP (the tax ratio), through reforms in the tax structure, or via increases in existing
tax rates. This can be achieved if donor countries utilize tax ratios and effort indices as
main indicators of Jordan' s commitment where future aid is possible only if that
commitment by Jordan is fulfilled.
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